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I Preface 
I divide my findings into three chapters. In the first chapter I study the effect of the Prospect 
Theory (PT) type of risk aversion, with a dynamic reference, on the decision to undertake 
sustainable development projects as defined in Articles 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Examples of such projects are rural electrification project using solar panels in San Ramon, 
Bolivia or the installation of more energy-efficient boilers in Egypt. ' In the second chapter I 
examine whether institutional constraints of the ETS have an effect on the risk perception of 
traders. Specifically, I test whether the price is affected by the Disposition effect (a tendency 
to realise gains and postpone losses), and how this varies throughout time. In the third 
chapter, I analyse an output decision of installations under conditions of uncertainty with 
regard to future environmental policies beyond 2012.1 will focus on the output implications 
of a three-period model where the representative installation displays ambiguity aversion. 
In the next three sections I briefly outline my main finýings. 
1.1 Chapter 1 
Valuation of an outcome relative to a reference point is well established in economic 
literature since Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Recent empirical evidence shows that some- 
times a valuation of an outcome with respect to a dynamic, rather than a static, reference can 
better explain behaviour anomalies under uncertain scenarios (among others see, Gooding 
et al., 1996 and Heath et al., 1999). Relative evaluation of projects that are originated from 
market-based mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
'For more details visit: http: //unfccc. int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718. phF 
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Implementation (R), against the price of the carbon permits and their continuous value 
evolution makes them natural candidates for the application of a dynamic framework 2. 
Unlike carbon permits, where the exchange of a commodity takes place among market 
participants and where no substantial benefit is provided to society, the CDM and the 
JI benefit both the entrepreneurs and host countries. An entrepreneur gains the desired 
carbon credits, and host countries achieve a valuable technology transfer. Such technology 
can support sustainable development in host countries and sustain the needs of the current 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs 
(WCED, 1983). However, unlike carbon trade, these projects are characterised. by high 
uncertainties and risks due to political and economic instability in the host countries. The 
application of a dynamic framework to such sustainable investment opportunities would 
assist policy makers in understanding the dynamics of decision-making and steer the market 
towards the desired path of emissions abatement. 
To study the effect of the PT type of risk aversion with a dynamic reference, I extend the 
Kyle et aL (2005) model of static reference valuation. I find that in contrast to the static 
framework, in a dynamic framework an agent considers risk and returns of both investment 
opportunities. I also show that, under condition of complement investment opportunities, 
agents would exhibit a Disposition effect relative to a static reference if they were to exhibit 
a Disposition effect relative to a dynamic reference. 
Based on these results I demonstrate that to encourage sustainable investments, both 
'Both the CDM and the JI are cost effective measures established by the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce 
emissions by way of technology transfers to developing countries. Articles 6 and 12 of the Protocol, 
define CDM and JI, respectively. 
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host and domestic policy makers should reduce the relative risk of a sustainable investment 
opportunity. It should be done with respect to the risk of a carbon permits portfolio, rather 
than merely an absolute risk of the sustainable projects. This can be achieved through the 
active intervention of policy makers in the stabilisation of the carbon market, in addition 
to regulation transparencies and international co-ordination between the host and domestic 
policy makers. 
1.2 Chapter 2 
The EU ETS covers the period from 2005 to 2012. The situation of policy uncertainty 
beyond 2012 contributes to an already existing tough challenge for policy makers in reducing 
emissions levels. Ignoring the behavioural aspect of decision under uncertainty might make 
this challenge even tougher and sometimes unachievable. I propose that uncertainty with 
regard to future rule of free permits allocation beyond 2012 contributes to such challenge by 
encouraging strategic behaviour that favours current polluters (the Ratchet effect). 
In this chapter I analyse the effect of information uncertainty on the output decision of 
installations that are subject to the carbon cap and trade framework of the ETS. The aim 
of the EU cap and trade policy is to reduce total emissions below the emissions levels of 
1990. In most EU member states, individual free allocation of permits to installations is 
based on their past emissions, a practice known as grandfathering. In order to reduce the 
possible Ratchet effect, where installations have an incentive to increase their current output 
to gain a larger share in future allocation, past emissions are taken from the period prior to 
the implementation of the Scheme. It seems that the assumption of the policy maker is that 
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this method of allocation eliminates the Ratchet effect. However, this assumption does not 
hold when one considers that the- policy should continue into the future. If grandfathering 
continues beyond 2012, then it is possible that current emissions would be considered in 
future allocations. This may encourage firms to act strategically and increase their current 
output to receive a larger share of free permits in the future. 
To investigate the impact of unknown future rule of free permits allocation on the output 
of installations, I divide my analysis into two parts: firstly, I demonstrate that there is a 
distinction between the effects of uncertainty and ambiguity on the current output in the 
market. Secondly, I show that ignoring uncertainty by the policy maker leads to incorrect 
policy design. 
I start my analysis by assuming that the current policy design ignores the uncertainty in 
the market. I have labelled it the Benchmark case. This is a simple two period model, which 
correspond to the two phases of EU ETS. I then release the certainty assumption and extend 
the model to three periods. The third period policy is assumed not to be known to the firms. 
I analyse two possible scenarios. One scenario is when the installations are uncertain as to 
the policy that governs in the third period. Another, more realistic, scenario is when the 
installations are ambiguous as to the policy that governs in the third period. Ambiguity 
is a particular type of uncertainty where the agent does not attach probabilistic measures. 
I apply the maxmin solution concept of Schmeidler and Gilboa (1998) to investigate the 
impact of ambiguity in future environmental policy on the total output of the market. 
I find that, with comparison to the output in the Benchmark case, the output increases 
both in uncertainty and ambiguity cases. The model, however, points out that in the presence 
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of ambiguity, current output of the firms increases even more than in the case of uncertainty. 
I show that in the presence of ambiguity, unlike uncertainty, policy makers can reduce the 
current output and achieve pollution abatement through ambiguity reduction. I suggest that 
this can be done in several ways. One way would be to gradually diminish the free allocation 
of permits in the future and adopt a mechanism of auctions. Higher proportion of auctioned 
permits in the future would diminish the Ratchet effect and, as a result, diminish the output. 
Another way is to encourage investments in clean technology. This could attribute to the 
diminishing sensitivity of future allocations, as the companies would give less consideration 
the future allocation of carbon permits. And finally, future policy transparency is another 
way which could diminish the installations' ambiguity and decrease their current output. 
1.3 Chapter 3 
The two Phases of ETS run from 2005 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2012. As a result of the 
banking ban on permits between two Phases, at the beginning of each Phase, the market 
is characterised by high information uncertainty about the real state of the market. The 
participants are uncertain as to whether the market is in a deficit or in a surplus of permits. 
The real state of the market becomes cleax by the end of April, when the submission process 
of permits is over and the European High Commissioner publishes the verified figures of 
emissions for the previous year. During this period the market tends to be highly volatile. 
For instance, the highest drop in the price of the carbon permit was during April 2006, when 
market participants understood that there was a surplus of permits in the market. 
The aim of this chapter is to study how such institutional constraints affect the pricing 
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mechanism of carbon permits during the First and Second Phases of the ETS. Firstly, I 
study whether the price dynamic is a factor of the Disposition effect, a well-documented 
anomaly in financial markets. Secondly, I analyse the effect of the institutional constraints 
on Disposition magnitude in the market. 
To construct a variable that detects the Disposition effect, I follow the method proposed 
by Grinblatt and Han (2005). 1 show robust evidence for the increased Disposition effect at 
the beginning of both the First and the Second Phases. In addition, my results indicate that 
the first compliance event of each Phase is crucial in decreasing and stabilising the Disposition 
in the market. This evidence points to the harmful effect of institutional constraints on the 
evolution of the carbon price at the beginning of a Phase. 
In the light of these results, I suggest increasing the frequency and transparency of the 
publications of the verified emissions figures to decrease the Disposition effect which distorts 
the efficiency of the carbon market. 
1.4 Final Word 
On 6 April 2009 the EU Commissioner published a draft of the ETS for the Third Phase. 
There are several propositions that attempt to increase the efficiency of the Scheme. Among 
those propositions are measures that increase the number of permits to be auctioned and to 
lift the ban on the inter-Phase banking of permits. 
These propositions are in line with the suggestions I make in my thesis. I believe those 
measures would serve the environmental policy in a way that would reduce, as I suggest, 
the effect of behavioural anomalies. This in turn could make the Scheme more efficient and 
10 
contribute to the final goal of a carbon emissions reduction. 
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Chapter 1: Evaluation with dynamic reference-Sustainable 
investment 
AbstrEict 
The Prospect Theory proposes to assess outcomes relative to a reference point (or 
benchmark). Although the literature recognises the relevance of dynamic benchmarks, 
most of the applications of Prospect Theory employ static reference points (or a status 
quo). This paper aims to develop a Prospect Theory framework for investment under 
uncertainty subject to a dynamic reference point, within the context of environmental 
policy making, where the distinction between a dynamic and a static frameworks is 
crucial. I evince that, in contrast to the static framework, in a dynamic framework 
the investor measures not only the absolute but also the relative risk premium (Sharpe 
ratio) of the investment opportunity, incorporating the risks and returns of a reference 
portfolio. I propose that there exists a relation between static and dynamic frameworks. 
Using the dynamic framework, I argue that in the environmental context international 
co-operation is the key to a successful environmental policy. 
Introduction 
Supply of a growing energy demand in the developling world without compromising sustain- 
able development, the ability to supply the needs of the current generation without com- 
promising the ability of future genrations to meet their own needs, is one of the challenging 
tasks that we are facing today (WCED, 1983). The introduction of new market-based mech- 
anisms by the Kyoto Protocol, such as the Clean Development Mechanism enable to transfer 
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and implement a valuable emission-reduction technology (aka. sustainable investment) in 
the developing countries that assist them, among other things, to meet growing demand for 
energy and enterpreneurs meet the targets set by the Protocol . Such mechanisms pose a 
new challenge to industry and policy makers. Such sustainable investment projects allow 
there entrepreneurs earn saleable certified emission reduction credits by reducing emissions 
in developing countries as a cheaper alternative to domestic emissions reductions. These 
opportunities are, however, characterised by high risks (Springer, 2003) in comparison to 
the riskiness of the carbon credits price. Therefore, the issue of the valuation method of this 
investment opportunity becomes relevant. 
The importance of the valuation of an outcome relative to a single reference point, as it 
is proposed by Prospect Theory, has been well established in the economic literature since 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). However, the authors argue that there may be situations in 
which gains and losses are measured in relation to levels different from the status quo. In 
such situations that inability to adapt to another reference level may encourage agents to 
take risks which would not otherwise be acceptable. The following example demonstrates 
the main idea behind the proposition. 
Let's take as an example a decision maker who invests in a project. Consider the initial 
value of the project to be the status quo. Assume the new value of the project to be below 
the initial value. The adjustment to a, new reference level may be due to unpredictable losses 
the agent has recently incurred to sustain the project. In addition, the decision maker is 
assumed to exhibit the Disposition effect. 3 The agent realises the gains by liquidating the 
'In the empirical literature there is extensive evidence of the Disposition effect (see, among others Dyl 
1977, Ferris et at. 1988, Goetzmann et at. 2008, Grinblatt et at. 2005 and more) 
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project and postpones the realisation of losses by keeping the project. I denote the new 
reference as Y' and the status quo as Y, where Y' < Y. When the value of the project is 
above Y (gain) the risk compensation is not enough for a Disposition-prone agent to keep 
the project. The agent, therefore, chooses to liquidate it as soon as possible. On the other 
hand, if the value of the project is below Y', which is also below Y (loss) by definition, the 
agent chooses to keep the project rather than liquidating it. This holds even if the agent 
fails to adjust the reference level. However, if the project's value is in between Y and Y', 
there is a clear difference between agents who accept the new reference Y1 and those who 
fail to do so. In the case where the agent fails to adjust the reference to Y', the value of the 
project is negative, and the agent prefers to postpone the realisation of losses rather than 
to liquidate the project. However, if the agent adjusts the reference to Y', the value of the 
project becomes positive, and the agent chooses to liquidate the project. 
Recent empirical evidence recognises that the notion of a dynamic reference and its 
location are important factors in predicting the behaviour of an agent exhibiting risk aversion 
as suggested by the Prospect Theory. Gooding et al. (1996) evince that in the context of 
firms, their risk-taking behaviour depends upon the location of the reference point rather 
than merely the relative position of a firm to the reference point. They also find that 
the reference point moves in both directions, as a function of some sample estimate of the 
population properties (e. g. mean, max, median). Heath et al. (1999) show that the agent's 
decision to exercise a stock option depends on its maximum level attained during the past 
year. Ivkovic et al. (2007) find that an investment made by individual investors, both returns 
relative to the market and absolute performance matter in determining stock sales. 
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New information is constantly axriving in the carbon market, thus changing the price 
of caxbon credits. The distinction, therefore, between static and dynamic evaluation is 
crucial. In this sense, an application of the dynamic reference in predicting the behaviour of 
a decision maker who holds a sustainable project seems natural. Failure to incorporate the 
dynamic reference may entail the wrong prediction of an agent's behaviour and in turn an 
inadequate policy design. In what follows I will consider a decision maker who invests in a 
CDM project to get extra credits to cover for its expected emission levels. Sudh an investor 
has an opportunity to purchase extra credits in the carbon market or by initiating CDM 
investment which can potentially award the investor with Certified Emission Reductions 
credits (CERs). ' The evaluation of such projects is a function of the number of expected 
issued Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) credits by the end of the project and their 
price in the carbon market. The number of issued CERs is uncertain and depends on the 
actual emission reduction that will be generated. The profitability of such an investment 
opportunity is made against the price of credit allowances that can be purchased'at one of 
the trading platforms over the counter (Schneider, 2008). 1 consider the initial value of the 
CDM project to be the expected number of issued CERs times their value in the carbon 
market, and the reference value for such a project is the equivalent value of carbon credits 
allowances. 
Prospect Theory value function applied to investment decisions helps to explain an anom- 
aly such as the Disposition effect (Kyle et al., 2006). The authors, however, restrict their 
analytical framework only to one static reference level. The aim of this paper is to extend the 
'For more details on the process of issuance visit the UNFCC cdm. unfc c. int 
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static framework into a dynamic one and suggest a generalised prediction of the behaviour 
of an agent under any reference, both static and dynamic. Unlike the static model, I assume 
that the reference level is an additional stochastic process. I define a new 'reference sensitive' 
project value Q, which is sensitive to the value of the reference project. I also show that 
there is a relation between the dynamic and static valuation frameworks. Specifically, the 
extended model detects that a decision maker who evaluates absolute performance can also 
evaluate the relative performance of the investment opportunity. This can explain different 
findings in the empirical literature regarding the location of a reference. As expected, in 
the extended model the liquidation decision depends on the relative risk and the returns 
of the reference portfolio with respect to risk and returns of the investment opportunity. 
Application of the extended framework to sustainable investments evinces that international 
co-operation and structured policy are the key to an efficient environmental policy. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic model and 
its solution. The first part shows the evolution of the model and three behavioural strategies 
of a decision maker with dynamic reference, where one of the strategies is consistent with 
the relative Disposition effect. The second part presents a link between relative and absolute 
Disposition effects. In section 3,1 demonstrate an application of the extended model to a 
risk averse agent in the environmental framework and discuss the implications of the model 
on policy analysis. Section 4 offers some conclusions; the appendix contains the proofs and 
developments. 
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The Model 
I extend the Status Quo model to allow for a dynamic reference level in the liquidation 
decision. In contrast with the model of Kyle et al. (2006), 1 account for the dynamics in 
the reference level. I also account for the fact that the same relative gain/loss is evaluated 
differently at different reference levels. For instance, if the reference is 1 and the gain is 10, 
the relative gain is 10-1=9. However, in case the reference is 101 and the absolute gain is 
110 the relative gain is also 9 (110-101), but the same gain is perceived differently at two 
reference levels. To account for this, I therefore construct a reference sensitive valuation. I 
I define a new 'reference sensitive' project value Qt =- -P' where Pt is the value of a sustainable Rt I 
project which depends upon the number of CERs issued and their spot price in the carbon 
market, and Rt is the reference value of the project in which the agent breaks even. The 
reference value depends on the spot price of the emissions allowances instead. Both spot 
prices can be obtained at one of the environmental trading platforms. One of the most liquid 
platform for carbon trade is Blue Next. 5 
The agent receives the value Pt of the project upon its liquidation at time 7- = min ['T1 s T21 - 
The liquidation of the project is either voluntary at time r2 or at natural liquidation at time 
7-1. Natural liquidation follows a Poisson distribution with arrival rate A. A rejection of a 
CDM project's baseline and/or methodoligy can be considered as a natural liquidation event 
in the context of this framework. 
I assume that the value of a sustainable project follows a Brownian motion dPtIPt = 
tzpdt + apdZt with constant parameters of drift pp and variance a,,. The introduction of 
"For details visit the website of Blue Next: http: //www. bluenext. fr 
17 
a reference requires an additional structure. In the empirical literature there are several 
alternative measures for a dynamic reference. For instance, Heath et al. (1999) and Gooding 
et al. (1996) base the reference on limited past data of the population properties (e. g. mean, 
max or median) - The author suggests that one year is an appropriate time period for the 
survival of the reference. ' Ivkovic et al. (2007), on the other hand, measure the performance 
of the stock relative to its market performance since the purchase. In all of the mentioned 
studies, the reference adjusts throughout time. To capture the dynamics of the reference, 
I assume that its evolution follows a geometric Brownian motion dRtIRt = yRdt + aRdWt 
with constant parameters of drift AR and variance UR. The assumption of the evolution of 
reference is general enough to nest all of the mentioned alternative measures of the reference. 
I assume that there exists a correlation between two Wiener processes, specifically, corr(dZt, 
dWt) = 
Upon the liquidation of the project agent realises his/her utility. Similarly to Kyle et al. 
(2006), 1 impose a piecewise exponential value function to evaluate the project: 
U(Qt) 
(1 - e-71(InQt. )) if Qt >1 (1) 
02(e'y, (InQt) _ 1) if 0< Qt < 
The value function (1) satisfies the following assumptions: 
Al An index of loss aversion 02 ýý' 1; 
A2 Local absolute risk aversion is -yj > 11 
A3 u'(l+) < u'(l-) so that 7, < 0271 ;7 
'In some cases, however, the whole historical data is taken, for example in the case of high watermarks 
where the hedge fund manager receives an incentive fee when the fund value is above the previous maximum. 
7 See Kobberling and Wakker (2005) for a detailed interpretation of parameter 02, which can represent 
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A4 Value function is smooth in the continuation region. 8 
Assumption Al ensures that the value function has a steeper curve in the region of gains. 
Assumptions A2, together with A3, ensure that the value function satisfies the properties of 
the Prospect Theory value function, with more sensitivity to losses than to gains, in addition 
to convexity below the reference. Using Ito's Lemma, the dynamic path of Qt is: 
dQ = ýupdZ - URM +R- OrPO'Rp)dt}Qt (2) 
(PP - PR + erl 
The drift of process Qt is: 
2 
AQ : ": AP - YR + t7R _ 6PaRP 
and the variance of process Qt is: 
aQ= (a2 + a2 -2cpaRp) pR 
To maximise (1), agents choose an optimal liquidation time 7*2 that maximises the expected 
value function: 
V(Qt) = max E[u(Q, )] Qt 
Following the static framework of Kyle et al. (2006), 1 set the time discount rate in the value 
function to zero. The optimal stopping time problem above can be written as: 
V(Qt) = max {u(Qt), Adt[u(Qt) - V(Qt)] + E[V(Qt + dQ) I Qt]l (4) Q 
the risk aversion at the reference and set equal to 02 
u' (1), ', 4 " 
T11 
'It is possible due to the fact that the value function is a transformation of smooth functional form, both 
below and above the reference level. 
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The function represented by Equation (4) is the maximisation between the value from liqui- 
dating immediately u(Q, ), and the value of postponing the liquidation Adt[u(Qt) - V(Qt)] + 
E[V(Qt + dQ) I Qt]. A4 assures that V(Qt) is a smooth function. I use Ito's Lemma to 
derive the differential equation of V(Qt). First, I evaluate the value function V(Qt) over the 
period of (t, t+ dt) by Taylor expansion: 
V QQQ2 E(dV) = VQQpQdt +1 cQdt (5) 
I denote F_, to be derivative of function F with respect to a variable x. If the project is not 
liquidated voluntarily, putting together (5) and (4) 1 get the following expression: 
VQQAQ +1 VQQQ, CQ - Av + Au =0 (6) 2 
I can identify that (6) consists of a homogeneous paxt VQQpQ + ! VQQQ2aQ - AV and a 2 
non-homogenous part Au. First, I solve its homogeneous part. 
iv 
QQQ20, Q _ /\V =0 VQQ'4Q +2, (7) 
The solution of (7) has the following form: 
V'(Qt) = AIQ" + B, Q"' (8) tt 
V-(Qt) ý A2Qto'l + B2Qct"2 (9) 
where V+ stands for the value function above and V- below the reference, and 
F(IIQ 1 U2 U2 -, YQ +1 Q)2 
a2 
Q)2 
Q 
10,2)2 
Ce2 
pQ - 
ý(ILQ 
-2Q+2, \uQ 
012 
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In order to find the solution to the value function V (Qt), I proceed to the specific solution 
of a non-homogenous part. 
3.1 Solution of a non-homogeneous part 
4 the relative Sharpe ratio of the project. Under (1), Proposition 1 Denote by S =- ý aQ 
(a) If Qt ý! 1, B(du(Qt)) 
>0 if S> 51-Y, + 51 
<0 otherwise. 
(b) If 0< Qt < 1, E(du(Qt)) 
>0 if S> -ýI-yj + 51 
<0 otherwise. 
The implication of the proposition is that if the value function is expected to increase 
over time, an agent would never liquidate the project voluntarily. However, if the value 
function is expected to decrease, an agent would liquidate the project immediately as the 
value oý holding the project is decreasing. 
In order to analyse the optimal strategy I adopt a similar method presented by Kyle et 
al. (2006). First, I restrict the value function to be smooth when Qt = 1. Imposing this 
condition I achieve that at earch reference, the agent is indifferent about whether to liquidate 
or not liquidate the project. This assists me in determining the optimal behaviour of an 
agent. I set the value function from never liquidating to the expected value function u: 
Vo(Qt) = E[u(Qt+r, )) (10) 
Function VO indicates that an agent holding the project would not liquidate it voluntary, 
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unless the expected value from holding the projected is expected to decrease in the future. 
For tractability of the proof I impose that at each reference point the value function has 
a yalue of zero. It is a simplifying assumption to make the calculation easier. Formally I 
impose 
limu(l) = 
This can be interpreted as the condition where the agent derives no utility from the project. 
Unlike the static framework, a liquidation decision of a project in a dynamic framework not 
only depends on the project's statistical values but also on the values of the reference and its 
correlation with the value of the project p. These additional parameters are an important 
addition to the static framework. It is possible to verify that the dynamic framework works 
down to the static framework if the reference is set to a constant parameter, specifically, 
R=1. In the following analysis of an agent's liquidation strategy there are 3 different cases 
to consider. Prior to each case specification, I surnmarise it in proposition. 
Proposition 2 If the Sharpe ratio is S> 51-yl + ý' and VO(l) > u(i) = 0, then V(Qt) is 22 
increasing in Qt and represented by: 
952c2'rl-cl'rl-02(c2-I)al-(CI-1)"l Q02 (In Qt) if Qt >1 
VO(Qt) 
012-01 t+ Cie-71 
02C2'Yj -Cl'Yj -02(C2-I)ck2-(Cl -I)ce2 (In Q, ) 
_ 1) if 0< 
Qt < 
ck2-al 
Qctkl + 02(C2e'yl 
where 
C, 
-YI)CrQ + 2( + 
C2 
x 
fyIjjQ + 1(, y2 _f )aQj 211 
(11) 
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Case 1: According to proposition 1, the relative Shaxpe ratio of the project is high 
enough to compensate the agent for the risk for any relative value Qt of the project. In 
addition, the value function (10)is expected to increase over time. In this case an agent has 
no incentive to liquidate the project voluntarily. When the relative value of the project is 
Qt =1 (where the project breaks even), the value of keeping the project (VO(l))is higher 
than liquidating it (u(l)). Therefore, the agent is better off by keeping the project and (11) 
>) is the value function from never liquidating the project voluntarily. 
Proposition 3 If the Sharpe ratio is S> Ly, +1 and Vo(l) < u(i) = 0, then V(Qt) is 22 
increasing, in Qt and represented by: 
C )Qct2 
V(Qt) It+1- 
Cie-'Y, ('nQt) if Qt >- 1 
(C e-y, (InQt) _ 1) if 0 ,: ý Qt -02(C2 - 1)Qal + 02 2 t 
and 
V, + (1) - vjý(l) ý (al - Cý2)VO(I) <0 Q 
Case 2: According to proposition 1, and similarly to case 1, the relative Sharpe ratio 
is high enough to compensate the agent for the risk for any value of Qt :A1 ((the project 
does not break even). However, if the project's relative value of the project is Qt =1 the 
agent would choose to liquidate the project as the sensitivity of the agent toward losses is 
higher than to gains around the reference. The latter conclusion results from the difference 
between slopes around reference (Qt = 1) and represented by (13). 
Proposition 4 If the Shrape ratio is -1-y, +1<S< 1-yj +' and Vo(l) < u(i) = 0, then 22-22 
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V(Qt) is increasing in Qt and represented by: 
V(Qt) =1- 
e-ti(InQt) if Qt >1 (14) 
-02M - 1)Qc'l + 02(C2e", (In Qt) _ 1) if Qt < 1. t 
and 
VQ (1) 
--` 
(02 -a 1) VO (1) Q 
Case 3: According to proposition 1, the relative Sharpe ratio of the project is not high 
enough to compensate the agent for the risk if its relative value is Qt > 1. . The agent 
would, therefore, choose to liquidate the project. Otherwise, the agent would choose to keep 
the project until its relative value is set to Qt = 1. As (15) points out, the sensitivity of the 
agent towards gains is higher than to losses around the reference, therefore, the agent would 
liquidate the project when it breaks even. 
3.2 Absolute and relative dispositions 
Financial literature provides strong evidence supporting the Prospect Theory valuation and 
the Disposition effect. There is, however, no consensus among scholars regarding what the 
appropriate reference should be. Odean (1998) presents evidence of the Disposition effect 
based on absolute returns. Godding et aL (1996), on the other hand, find strong evidence for 
a dynamic reference and reject the existence of any fixed reference in the context of firms' 
risk taking behaviour. Heath et al. (1999), find evidence for a dynamic reference in the 
context of exercising stock options. Ivkovic et al. (2005), however, find that stock purchases 
made by individual investors are driven by both absolute and relative valuations. In light of 
this extensive evidence, I argue that there exists a relation between the two frameworks. 
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To do so, I draw attention to Proposition 4. It states that under certain conditions an 
agent exhibits a relative Disposition effect. In particular, agents choose to liquidate the 
project when it has relative gains and postpone the liquidation if it has relative losses. I 
argue that if agents exhibit an absolute Disposition on the project and its reference, then they 
would also exhibit a relative Disposition effect. I surnmarise it in the following proposition: 
Proposition 5 Denote by vp =- Eý and VR E: 14 absolute Sharpe ratios of a project and its arp OR 
reference, respectively. If under (1), - 
'-yj +1< vp < 1, yj +. 1; - 
Ly, +1< vp < Ly, +. 1 22222222 
andp: 50, then -1-yl+l <S< 1-yl+ ' 22-22 
The proposition suggests that there might be cases of absolute, relative and combined 
Disposition effects. It can, therefore, explain the variety of empirical evidence which is 
not conclusive of what the appropriate reference should be. Although the conditions of 
Proposition 5 are restricted to the case where projects and their references complement 
investment opportunities, the result is very important in understanding the risk perception 
of decision makers under valuation with reference. 
4 Disposition and sustainable development 
Insley (2003) suggests that the riskiness of sustainable projects plays a vital role in the 
incentives of undertaking emissions reduction projects. Furthermore, Schneider (2008) argues 
that the profitability of a sustainable project, such as the Clean Development Mechanism, 
is evaluated against the profitability of holding carbon allowances. In addition, an empirical 
analysis presented in part 3 of this thesis points to the evidence of a dynamic disposition 
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effect which affects the spot price of carbon alowances. The analysis there is based on the 
intra-daily data of carbon spot prices which are obtained at the BlueNext environmental 
exchange platform. 9 
The later evidence together with the fact that the value of carbon allowances and sus- 
tainable projects are in constant shift, makes application of the above relative valuation 
framework suitable for the analysis of such investment opportunities. Among all the results 
provided in the previous section, Proposition 4 seems the most suitable for such an analysis, 
as it detects the well-documented Disposition effect. Conducting such analysis could lead 
policy makers-to a better understanding of decision-making dynamics in the context of sus- 
tainable development projects. This analysis would improve the efficiency of environmental 
policies and give a more accurate guidance to policy makers about measures to be taken 
to create incentives in favour of sustainable projects. In what follows, I discuss firstly the 
way that the Disposition effect is eliminated using the framework of Proposition 4, where I 
detect such an effect. Secondly, I apply this framework to the analysis of decision-making 
dynamics in the context of sustainable development projects, such as the CDM. 
4.1 How to eliminate disposition 
According to Proposition 4, decision makers who exhibit relative Disposition evaluate the 
profitability of holding a project according to the following inequality 
9For more details see part 3 of the thesis. 
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1 1)0-2 112 
p< PR Ilp -f, + -2 2 yj +2 
)UR 'yl6PCRP (16) 
1212 
PP -Yl +) L7P PR-(-^fl+-)CrR+'YJO'PLTRP (17) 2222 
where P and R are the values of a project and its reference portfolio, respectively. By 
assumption A2, (-1-yl + 1) <0 and (1-yl + 1) > 0. Conditions of (16) therefore, suggest 2222 
that it is not enough to reduce the risk of the project (o, 2) to eliminate the Disposition effect. P 
To do so, one should reduce the risk of the project so that its risk would be relatively lower 
than the risk of theyeference portfolio. Technically, the inequalities (16) should become 
1121 1)0,2 
pp -yl + WP > PR y, +R- 'YJ0rPOrRP i22 
Inequality (18) satisfies Proposition 3, which gives decision makers an incentive to keep the 
project rather than liquidating it. Proposition 5, however, points to an additional difficulty. 
It is possible that decision makers holding the project exhibit both relative and absolute 
Disposition effects. In this case, it is not enough to reduce the relative riskiness of the 
project. It is also necessary to ensure that the riskiness of a project is low enough to 
eliminate both relative and absolute Disposition effects. 
4.2 Application 
As I mention above, a sustainable project (such as the CDM project) is evaluated against the 
profitability of holding carbon allowances. In what follows, I, therefore, denote sustainable 
project and carbon portfolio absolute values to be P and R, respectively. The desired goal 
of eliminating the Disposition effect in the context of sustainable projects can be achieved in 
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two ways. One is to reduce the absolute risk of the project, 0,2, p by the CDM host country. 
Another is to reduce the riskiness of the reference portfolio, C2 R, by the domestic policy 
maker. Jn order to do that, the policy maker should understand the source of such risks. 
Schneidler (2008) suggests that agents' incentives of holding sustainable projects lie 
within the riskiness of these projects. These projects are often characterised by high risks 
and uncertainties. Springer (2003) outlines the potential sources of the risks involved in such 
projects. Among them: 
Technological risk: The final allocation of credits to the entrepreneur is a function of the 
actual emission reduction in the host country. Delays or actual output reduction of factories 
in the host country, therefore, result in fewer emissions reductions than actually planed. As 
I 
a result, the entrepreneurs receive fewer credits than was originally planned. 
Economic risk: In addition to the technological risks, the entrepreneur is exposed to the 
economic factors that affect any investment opportunity. Interest rates, exchange rates and 
the price of foreign land are among the. factors that can have a major impact on the riskiness 
of the sustainable project. 
Political risk: The Kyoto protocol restricts the CDM mechanism to be implemented in 
developing countries. These countries are often characterised by restrictive regulations and 
political instability. These factors contribute to the already existing uncertainty surrounding 
these projects and have the potential of increasing the riskiness of such projects. 
Investment opportunities usually incorporate some sort of risk. Technological risks are 
among them. Therefore, it is up to the entrepreneur of such projects to deal with these risks 
by all means available. One of the accustomed ways of reducing riskiness of investment is by 
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a way of diversification. Enterpreneurs wanting to achieve a cheaper alternative to domestic 
emission reductions should face the risk as any entrepreneur undertaking a risky investment 
opportunity. Political risk, however, is the real market failure that may hinder involvement 
of the private sector in the emission reduction investments. These are risks that private 
entrepreneurs cannot change by their own behavior and fully diversify. Policy makers should 
aim at eliminating those unnecessary risks. 
The risk classification above is not a clear cut and there are areas in which the categories 
can overlap. For instance, economic risk can be viewed differently by enterpreneurs and 
policy makers. For example, as shown by Springer (2003), the profitabilty of a CDM project 
that aims to increase efficieny in the electricity sector in a host country is affected by the 
demand for energy in the host country. However, the demand for energy also depends on the 
regulation in the sector in the host country. Whereas the entrepreneur can view the later as 
a political risk, the policy maker, on the other hand would classify such risk as an economic 
risk. In such a scenario, no actions should be taken by the policy maker as this is the kind 
of risk that international entrepreneurs are faced with. 
It is worth noting at this point that emissions reduction projects, such as CDMs, should 
not be classified as a pure financial investments, as they bring with elements that are outside 
pure economic benefits but also benefits to the society in a way of promoting a sustainable 
development and technologic spillovers, that would not happen otherwise. In such framing it 
is not clear whether policy makers should remain indifferent players in the face of economic 
risks. In what follows I describe the way the policy makers could address these issues. 
The carbon concentration in the atmosphere is a global problem and not restricted by 
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geographical borders. It is, therefore, in the global interest to encourage measures that have 
the potential for reducing emissions in areas where such measures are likely to contribute 
more on a marginal basis. Clean Development Mechanism, have a direct impact of achiev- 
ing the efficient reduction of carbon emissions globally through economic incentives and 
contributing to valuable technology transfer through investments in sustainable projects in 
developing countries by foreign entrepreneurs. In the long term CDM projects are changing 
the course of development in the host countries through a valuable technology transfer and 
potential spillovers. These factors have the potential of reducing the current caxbon foot- 
print in the developing world and also contribute to sustainable development in the future. 10 
As of April 2010 UNFCC reports that more than 4,200 projects axe in the pipeline. These 
projects could potentially generate more than 2,900 millions of CERs by 2012. Out of them 
2,128 project are currently registered and 72 projects requesting registration by the CDM 
Executive Board. So far, there are 399,861,040 of issued CERs and 406,752,157 requesting an 
issuance. Many of the projects will continue to operate well beyond 2012 and are expected to 
generate an estimated of 6,484,807 GtonC02 by 2030. The methodology that prevails in the 
CDM is the energy industry constituing 27-62% of the approved methodology by scope. As 
of March 2010 Hydro Power and Wind Power are the leading sources for the total number of 
CDM projects registration with 561 and 296, respectively. However, judging from the scope 
of total emission reductions, HFC reductions and N20 decomposition are responsible for 
the majority of emission reductions with 484,567 and 252,268 GtonC02 emission reductions, 
"'For discussion on the sustainable effect of CDM projects see Olsen, 2007. 
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respectively. 1112 
It is evident that structured regulations are one of the ways of eliminating unneces- 
sary risks. Empirical evidence shows that host countries which have structured regulations 
on Kyoto-related institutions, attract most of the investment from the devel9ped countries 
(Oleschak et al., 2007). Countries such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico so far have 
registered 36-97%, 23.39%, 8.03% and 5.64% of total registered CDM projects. Also in 
terms of expected annual average of CERs the situation is similar. China, India and Brazil 
are leading with 59.42%, 11.98% and 5.96% of total annual reduction from CDM projects. 
Structured regulations can contribute to boosting local sustainable technology and reducing 
substantively the emissions in those regions. Fast growing economies, such ass those of China 
and India, are also rapidly increasing their carbon footprint. It is, therefore, not enough to 
adhere to the targets set up by the developed countries, such as those in the EU, to eliminate 
the potential threat of global warming. More structured measures, involving international 
co-operation, should be implemented. 
Another aspect of the successful emissions reduction is in international co-operation. In- 
ternational co-operation is the key to the successful implementation of any sustainable policy. 
Separate actions of host and domestic countries. of the entrepreneurs require substantial ef- 
fort from both sides to achieve emissions reduction targets. This important factor could, 
potentially, create a situation similar to the prisoner's dilemma, where neither side would 
be willing to reduce domestic emissions. This is very similar to the current situation, where 
IL Much of the critism was pointed on the sustainability of CERs originated from Hydroplants and HCF 
CDM projetcs. For an example of the criticism on the HFC methodology see Schwank, 2004. 
"For more details visit: http: //www. iges. or. jp/cdm/report-cdm. html 
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developing countries are not willing to reduce their emissions; whereas developed countries 
are reluctant to credit the investors for potential emissions reduction in host countries and 
investors are, therefore, not willing to invest. This scenario is not desirable. International co- 
operation can eliminate these obstacles more effectivelY. Co-operative efforts can eliminate 
the riskiness of the projects. According to my framework above, these steps would dimin- 
ish Disposition both by incurring lower costs and using the comparative advantage of each 
economy in tackling this issue. As changes in regulation have an effect on the risk structure 
in the market (Grout et aL, 2006), the transparency of domestic (Nondek et aL, 2005) and 
foreign policies is the way of reducing the riskiness of these investment opportunities (IPCC, 
2000). 
Conclusion 
This paper extends the static framework of liquidation decisions, first presented by Kyle et 
al., 2006.1 have constructed a new relative valuation which is reference sensitive. I have 
incorporated dynamics of reference in the decision and show that in this framework, decision 
makers can also exhibit the Disposition effect, found in many empirical studies. I have showed 
that there is a relation between the Disposition decision in static and dynamic frameworks. 
I have applied a decision making under dynamic reference to the liquidation decision of 
sustainable projects, such as the CDM. I have showed that the behavioural pattern with 
dynamic reference can play a major role in the implementation of the environmental policy. 
I have evinced that dynamic reference can play a role in the investment decisions and thus has 
to be taken into account by pdlicy makers in implementing policy in constantly changing 
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settings such as environmental projects. I have argued that international co-operation is 
the key to the successful implementation of sustainable developments. This argument is in 
line with a proposition made by Barret (2007). Barrat argues that successful provision of 
global public goods such as environmental protection cannot be acheived by the sole, even 
powerfull country. According to the author, countries need to cooperate on implementing 
mechanisms such as CDMs. The key issue in success of such mechanism is in the enforcement. 
Strong enforcement can only be acheived, according to the author, by incentive oriented 
international cooperation. 
A possible extension to the framework would be to incorporate different types of risk 
aversion at different reference levels. So far, the literature deals with a single reference. 
However, introducing dynamics to the reference can pose some doubt as to the assumption 
of unified risk aversion at the reference. Kbbberling and Wakker (2005) assumed that risk 
aversion at the reference set equal to which is the ratio of marginal utilities axound U, (1) 
reference. However, one could think of different risk aversion at different reference. It is 
similar to the situation of different valuation of the equal absolute gain/loss. For instance, 
when considering reference of 10 and 1000 it is not necessary that ! 
ý±-(10) 
= !. 
ý(1000) as the U, (10) 
N1000), 
decision maker would be more sensitive to changes in gain/loss around reference of 10 than to 
the same change around reference of 1000. Although it is an interesting idea, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. It shows, however, a promising way of extending the current framework 
of decision making under dynamic valuation. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A. 1 Derivations 
1 Properties of a piecewise function (1) 
First, I derive the shape of the value function when Qt ý! 1: 
I --y, (InQt) >0 UQ = -Y,; U, -e 
UQQ ý ^11(- 1 e--fl('nQ, ) - Wl -yle-'Y, 
(InQt)) < 0. 
satisfying the properties of a concave function. 
The shape of the value function when 0< Qt < 
UQ : --2 0271-Le'Y1(InQt) ý,. 0 Q1. 
UQQ: "'2 02'tl(- Wle"10"Q0 + il 17 
y, e'y, (InQ,. )) >0 
if f -Y, > 1. 
satisfying the properties of a convex function. 
A. 1.2 The dynamics of (2) 
First I define the partial derivatives of Q with respect to Pt and Rt: 
Qp =1; QR =-p ; QPR =-1; QPP = 0; QRR = 
2P 
T2 N2- 
using Ito's Lemma, I derive the evolution of 
dQ = QpdP + QRdR + 112Qppd2P + 1/2QRRd2R + QPRdPdR (20) 
putting together (19) and (20) results in: 
= Qp(tipdt+O'PdZt)P+QR(PRdt+aRdWt)R+112QPpp2Cr2pdt+112QRRR 2 L72 Rdt+QPRPRapO'Rpdt 
(21) 
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e putting together (19) and (21) results in: 
1 
PapdZt -P ROrRdWt +(1 PAP -P 
RYR + 1/2 
2PR2a2 1 
PRaPaRp)dt 
R T2 R T2 T3 'r' - T2 
rearranging 
+0,2 updZ - URdW + (AP - YR R- aPCrRp)dt1Q 
A. 1.3 The optimal stopping of (4) 
V(Qt) = max {u(Qt), Au(Qt)dt + (1 - Adt)E[V(Qt + dQ) I Qtjj Qt 
max lu(Qt), Au(Qt)dt - AdtE[V(Qt + dQ) I Qt] + E[V(Qt + dQ) I Qtl} Qf 
max lu(Qt), Adt[u(Qt) - V(Qt)] + E[V(Qt + dQ) I Qtj} Qt 
4 The Taylor expansion of (5) 
E(dV) =E VQdQ +1 VQQ(dQ)2 
f21 
=Ef VQ[QapdZ - QoRdW + QpQdt] +1 VQQ(QapdZ - QaRdW)2 2 
iv 
QQQ2(a2 + or2 = VQQjtQdt +2, pR- 
2o-pcrRp)dt 
A. 1.5 Solution of the homogeneous part of (7) 
Noting that (7) has a standard solution of the V(Qt) = AQt' form, I define its derivatives 
in the following fashion: 
VQ = AciQ'-' 
VQQ = Aa(a - 1)Q"-2 
(22) 
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putting together (22) and (7) results in: 
1Qt 
1)Q, -2 -2)Q2 (OQ tAa(a- + tiQQtAaQ"-' - AAQ' =0 2ttt 
dividing both sides by AQ' gives way to: 
12 
erQa(a - 1) + (PQ)a -, \ =0 (23) 
The solutions to (A5) are: 
al = 
12_ AO, 2 ýOrQ [jQ+V(jLQ-jor2)2+2 2QQ 
-, 
02 "": 
Appendix A. 2 Proofs 
2 
Q 
1 or2 - IIQ - V/(tLQ LT2 )2 +2 \or2 iQ2Q 
__ _Q 
t7 
2 
B. 1 Proof of Proposition 1 
(a) First and second order derivatives of u(Qt): 
UQ = -Y, 
1e-, 
y, (InQt) = (__y2 
11 
-)e-fi(InQt) (24) Qt ; UQQ 1 Tt2 -ýt2 
using Ito's Lemma: 
E(du(Qt)) = ]E{uQdQt +1 uQQd2Qtl (25) 2 
putting together (24) and (25): 
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1121122 
(In 1-Y, QtttQ +-y -]Qt a }e-"' Q')dt Qt 2 Qt2 I Qt2 Q 
then rearranging: 
B(du(Qt)) = -y, {ILQ -2 ol 2 }e-"'("Q)dt. 2 710, Q 2Q 
(b) In a similar fashion: 
I 
-Yl(lnQt). 
1-1 
)erl(InQt) (26) UQ "ýý 0271 -ý-t eI UQQ = (0271 -ý-t2 0271 Qt2 
putting together (25) and (26): 
027 
1 
'_]Qt2C2 
-11 (In {0271-ý 
t 
QtAQ +2 0271; ýý Qt2 Qje 
Q')dt 
then rearranging: 
E(du(Qt)) = 02-flfPQ +1 -flu 
2U2I. -yi(In Q')dt 
2Q2Q 
A. 2.1 Proof of Proposition 2 
I impose on the value function V(Qt) to satisfy the following boundaxy conditions: (a) 
limVQ_. (Qt) =1 and (b) limV, _. 
(Q, ) = -02. These conditions assure that the value 
function is 
bounded. I also impose on V(Qt) to have a smooth and continuous passing at each refer- 
ence. Mathematically, I impose (c) lim V'(1) = lim V- (1) and (d) lim VQ+ (1) = lim Vj (1). 
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Therefore the following must hold: 
(a) lim V(oo) = I=* A, = 0 (27) 
(b) lim V(O) = -02 =* B2 = 
(C) limv, (l) = limv-(l) (28) 
B QQ2 (In QL) (C2efj(InQt) It+ Cie-71 
A2Q't'+02 
t 
Bl+l-Cl = A2+02(c2-l) 
Bi = A2+02(c2-l)+Cl-l 
(d) lim VQ+ (1) = lim V, ý (1) 
which is equivalent to: 
Q012 -y, e-"'("Ql) A2alQctkl + 02'fIC2e'yl("Ql) Bja2 t+C, (29) 
Qt Qt 
when Qt = 1, (29) becomes: 
BI"2 + ItICI = A2Cýl + 02-tIC2 
putting together (28) and (29): 
(A2 + 402(C2 - 1) + Cl - 1)C12 + 'YJCI = A2Cýl + 02'YIC2 (30) 
rearranging (30) 
A2 = 
02C2'Yl - Cl'yl - 02(C2 - 1)02 - (Cl - 1)02 
a2 - al 
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In a similar fashion: 
B, 
02C271 - Cl^fl - 02(C2 - 1)"l - (Cl - 1)CII 
02 - Cil 
Proof of Proposition 3 
I impose on the value function V(Qt) to satisfy the following boundary conditions, (a) 
lim V(oo) =I and (b) "M V(O) = -02. These conditions assure that the value function is 
bounded. Therefore, (27) must, hold. I also impose on V(Qt) to be continuous. Mathe- 
matically, I impose (c) lim V'(1) = lim V- (1) = 0. Then, 
BjQl2 +1- Cie-"'("Q) =0 
Bi = -(1 - Cl) 
and 
V- (1) = B2Qc'l + 02 (C202 (In Q) _ 1) =0 (32) 
B2 : -- '02(1 - C2); 
The derivative of V(Q) with respect to Q: 
VQ+ (1) = 
-(l - CI)Cý2QQ2 + Ciyle-'f, (InQ) (33) 
Q 
v4i(l) -02(C2 - 
1)alQc" + 02C2, yle-", (InQ) 
Q 
when Q == 1, (33) becomes 
V, + cl)02 + Cl'Yj Q 
-02(C2 - 1)al + 02C271 
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and their difference is 
V+ (1) - vcý(l) ----: -(l - 
CI)a2 + Cl'Yj + 02(C2 - I)Ctl - 02C271' (01 - a2)VO(l) <0 Q 
Proof of Proposition 
I impose on the value function V(Q) to satisfy the following boundary conditions (a) 
liM V(O) ý- 02. This condition assures that the value function is 
bounded. 
lim V(O) = -02 => A2 = 
I also impose on V(Q) to be continuous. Mathematically, I impose (c) limV+(1) = 
Jim V- (1) = 0. Therefore, (32) is satisfied. In addition, the derivative of V(Q) with respect 
to Q: 
V+(Qt) Q 
V6 (Qt) 
when Qt --* 1, (34) becomes 
O'l + 02C2-yle-"Y, (InQ, ) -02(C2 - ')CýlQt 
Qt 
V, +(Qt) Q 
-02(C2 - 1)al + 02C271 
and their difference is 
-02(C2 - 1)01 + 02C2'yl - ^11 ý2 
(02 
- Ckl)(VO) 
Proof of proposition 5 
(34) 
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Under static reference the Disposition conditions of the project P and reference R are: 
+2 Vp <+2 (35) 
+2 VP <2 ly, +. 2 
(36) 
rearranging (36): 
1 
yj +1 )0.2 <0 (37) ttp - (2 2p 
yj +2 ttp 2 2)up >0 
rearranging (36): 
PR -(1 yj +1 )a, <o (38) 22R 
11), 
72 PR - (_ 2 -il +2R 
taking together (37) and (38): 
(1, yl + 
1)0,2 112 
22p 
"- AR 
271 +2 
)OrR (39) 
t1p 
1 
^fj +1) or2 
112 
22p 
1"' AR 
271 +2 
)L7R 
under the assumption that p :50 (39) is equivalent to 
22 AP 
271 +2 
)0 
p AR 2 71 +2 
)CR - 'YIO'PLTRP 
I_Lp _( _ -yl + )0,2 ýý' MR (ý, yj + _)62 + 'YJ17PCRP 22p2R 
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alternatively, condition (39) becomes 
+ Cr2 1 ßP - MR R11 +<22 
2 UP + UR 
which is equivalent to 
yj +<S !ý yj + 2222 
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Chapter 2: Environmental policy under ambiguity 
Abstract 
In 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, industrialised countries signed a protocol, agreeing to 
reduce their collective GHG emissions. The protocol establishes flexible mechanisms 
for reducing the industrial carbon footprint, mainly through economic incentives. One 
of the first implementations of the protocol within a framework of cap and trade is the 
EU Environmental Trading System (ETS). Recent evidence, however, points out that 
there are serious flaws and inefficiencies in the way the Scheme operates. For instance, 
instead of an expected decrease, several industrialised EU members are experiencing 
an increased emissions-to-cap ratio (total emissions relative to allocated permits). In 
addition, some suggest that spot price volatility in the carbon market has a profound 
impact on long-term investment risk and in turn affects the efficiency of the market. It 
seems, therefore, that there are some factors that policy makers have neglected in the 
design of the environmental policy. The main contribution of my work is to suggest 
that behavioural anomalies are the cause for the inefficiencies in the environmental 
policy. 
Introduction 
The aim of the EU's environmental policy is to gradually reduce total emissions below the 
emissions levels of 1990. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) aims to reach this 
goal in the most economically efficient manner. The essence of the EU ETS is to cap the total 
emissions of the economy and assign individual installations with allowances, so that the total 
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number of permits does not exceed the cap. To create incentives to reduce the emissions, 
the ETS allows emissions permits to be freely traded. In most EU member states, individual 
allocation is based on historical emissions, a practice known as grandfathering. In order to 
reduce the possible Ratchet effect, where the installations have an incentive to increase their 
current production to gain a larger share in free future allocation, historical emissions from 
the period prior to the implementation of the EU ETS is taken. For instance, in the National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) of the UK it is said explicitly that historical emissions prior to the 
ETS implementation is taken; otherwise, it might create incentives in some sectors to emit 
more. 13 
Post-Kyoto negotiations are currently taking place and there exists a draft of the policy 
for the years 2012-2020. Although the draft specifies that free allocation would gradually 
diminish, it does not specify how the remaining free allocation would take place. This 
uncertainty in policy contributes to an already existing tough challenge for policy makers 
to reduce emissions levels in a constantly growing global economy where demand for energy 
is rising. Ignoring the behavioural aspect of the problem might make this challenge even 
tougher and sometimes impossible to achieve. 14 
Despite the interaction between companies' strategy and market uncertainty, very little 
discussion has been dedicated to the analysis of companies' behaviour under policy uncer- 
tainty. The aim of my paper is to extend existing literature on the allocation of carbon 
permits. I investigate how uncertainty and ambiguity resulting from the lack of an envi- 
OSection 3.5 in the UK NAP for the Second Phase (2008-2012). 
14 Stern (2006) mentions ambiguity as a possible method in the analysis of appropriate reaction of society 
to climate change. 
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ronmental policy impact production. I show that there is a clear distinction between the 
impacts of uncertainty and ambiguity on the total production in the maxket. Moreover, 
I demonstrate that ignoring the lack of information in the carbon market might lead to 
incorrect policy design. 
In order to conduct the analysis, first, I present the literature that deals with the allo- 
cation of permits and uncertainty. Then, I lay down the model which is based on the UK 
model of NAP regarding carbon permits. Later, I investigate how the lack of a post-Kyoto 
environmental policy impacts the total output of the market. In addition, I extend the basic 
theoretical framework by incorporating ambiguity into the model. Finally, I compare the 
changes in the output that are driven by ambiguity and uncertainty. 
In order to investigate the effect of uncertainty, I adopt a mean-preserving spread tech- 
nique. To study the impact of ambiguity, however, I use the accepted method of the Choquet 
integral. To conduct this analysis I use an output-based allocation model in the Cournot 
Oligopoly. To get an empirically related analysis I use the UK NAP for the years 2008-12 
(Second Phase) which has been approved by the EU Commission on 29 November 2006, as 
a case study. I will put forward some policy recommendations in the concluding section of 
the paper. 
Literature review 
The optimal allocation rule of carbon permits has been one of the main issues for a debate 
in the policy design for the First (2005-2007) and the Second (2008-2012) Phases in the 
implementation of the Kyoto protocol. There has been extensive research on the efficiency 
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of different methods of allocation. Several alternative policies have been analysed: auctioning 
(Cramton and Kerr, 2002), pollution taxes (Baldursson et al., 2004, Haucap et al., 2003), 
free and output-based allocation (see Fischer 2001; Haucap and Kirstein, 2003; Neuhoff, 
Grubb and Keats, 2005). " 
Most of the EU member states choose to distribute their available permits based on 
historic output and/or emissions levels, a method called grandfathering. In the NAP of the 
UK, Germany and Austria, " allocation of permits to the existing companies is determined 
according to their share in the historic emissions prior to the First Phase. One of the main 
justifications for using historical data on emissions/output, beside the practical difficulties 
of collecting updated data, is that this method eliminates companies' strategic behaviour. 
Adopting a more recent emissions/output may encourage high productivity and reward less 
efficient firms for continuing to emit at higher levels. (Ahman et al., 2005; Fischer, 2003). 
Two additional issues concern policy makers: the allocation of permits to new entrants 
and the closure of existing companies. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that most EU member states choose to set aside some permits 
for new entrants at the New Entrant Reserve (NER). " New entrants receive their permits 
from the NER according to a benchmark level of emissions, which is the estimated emissions 
projection for each sector. 18 
"', Most EU member states (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Poland, etc. ) choose to allocate the majority 
of available emission permits and auction only a small part of them. 
"These are the only NAPs available in English. 
171 refer the readers to the UK NAP section 1.15 for Second Phase, for detailed view of the 
methods and incentives behind the allocation plan. It can be found on the following website: 
http: //www. defra. gov. uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/index. htm 
"Appendix D1 UK NAP. The same benchmark spreadsheet is used to determine the relevant emission for 
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Despite a rigorous analysis of the optimal allocation of carbon permits, most of the 
research conducted in this area ignores the important fact that there is no detailed policy 
on free allocations after the Kyoto protocol expires in 2012. This fact creates uncertainty 
in which companies that are subject to emissions cap and trade of permits will have to 
consider a variety of future policies. Although they can anticipate possible scenarios, it 
is highly unlikely that they can anticipate their exact probability distribution. Therefore, 
their lack of information creates a special sort of uncertainty, often referred to as ambiguity. 
In the presence of ambiguity, no matter how much more information companies gather to 
calculate their optimal behaviour, they will remain uncertain as to the correct probability 
distribution of possible policy scenarios. In the organisational context, where management 
faces dispersed knowledge, the distinction between ambiguity and uncertainty is of great 
importance (Becker, 2001). 
The distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity in the decision maker's (DM) state 
of mind is well defined in the economic literature (see for example Ellsberg, 1961; Mukerji, 
1997). Schmidler and Gilboa (1989) have developed an axiomatic representation of decision, 
in which they distinguish between situations where the DM is aware of the objective probabil- 
ities of underlying scenarios and where he/she is not. The former is regarded as uncertainty 
and the latter as ambiguity. In the case of uncertainty one may use a standard approach 
of expected values, whereas in the case of ambiguity one cannot. The main reason is that 
ambiguity cannot be represented by an additive probability distribution. In the presence of 
ambiguity the DM's subjective beliefs are represented by a convex non-additive probability 
incumbent firms. 
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k, sometimes referred to as Knightian probability or capacity. To deal with this special case 
of uncertainty, the Choquet integral is accepted as the main tool for evaluating the expected 
value (Scmeidler, 1989; Sarin and Wakker, 1992). Schmidler and Gimlboa (1989) show that 
given a convex non-additive probability k, the Choquet integral is a simple minimum of all 
possible values. Putting it another way, I find the most pessimistic expected value. " 
One recent application of ambiguity aversion is made in the context of a company's irre- 
versible investment decision (Nishimura et al., 2007). In that context the authors find that 
the effect of ambiguity is drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty. Given 
these results it seems natural to extend existing literature on emissions allocation, incor- 
porating ambiguity into the production decision of companies. It would be interesting to 
compare companies' decisions under these two sorts of uncertainties. In order to make the 
proposed model more realistic, I choose to base it on one of the EU states' NAP. Due to the 
relative simplicity of the UK NAP's method of allocation, I adopt it as our case study. 
The Model 
9.1 Preliminaries of the model 
According to the UK NAP, carbon permits are allocated on the sectorial level (i. e., permits 
are allocated first to the whole market and then divided among sectors of the market). 
Therefore, I choose to focus my analysis on each sector individually. First, I derive results 
assuming that companies know the exact probability distribution of potential future policies 
"For an example of how to use the Choquet integral see Dow et al., (1992) 
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(Uncertainty Case). Then, I release the later assumption and analyse a scenario in which 
companies do not know the exact distribution but rather hold a set of possible probability 
distributions of potential future policies (Ambiguity Case). ' 
T-defined as a time horizon of the model. tET can be any natural number between 
(0, oo). I restrict our model to three periods only, t <- 3. First, I derive results from a 
two-periods model. Next, I extend the two-periods model to incorporate the third period as 
well. In the three-periods model I assume that companies are not aware of the allocation 
method that governs in period t=3. 
N- is the total number of companies in the sector, s. t. iEN= (0, oo). 20 
qf- is an output that each company i produces in period t. I assume that companies 
choose their level of production at the beginning of each period t. 
Qt- is a total output in the sector in period t. 
Et- is a total of issued permits for distribution in the sector in period t. The policy maker 
(in our case, the UK government) sets the cap of total permits to emit Greenhouse Gases 
(GHG) in order to comply with its obligation to reduce its national emissions level. Each 
permit allows the emission of one metric tonne Of 
C02- 
e1i - is verified emissions of company i in period t. I assume that actual emissions are 
expressed as a linear function of companies' output, where 6t = (0, oo) is the marginal rate 
of emissions in period t. For simplicity, I assume that companies in the same sector have 
an identical marginal rate of emissions 6'. 11 Although it i§ a strong assumption which is not 
20ft is also possible to assume a different number of firm operating in each period t. However, the 
assumption that in each period there is an identical number of firms will not affect the qualitative result. 
21 It is a reasonable assumption since I am dealing with companies in the same sector. A similar assumption 
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supported in reality, it does not change the qualitative result of this paper. The only place 
where this assumption is implimented is when I derive the relative allocation based on the 
historic benchmark of the company. To avoid using this assumption, one could analyse the 
output-based allocation (a different variation of the grandfathering rule), instead, and would 
get to an equivalent result. 
Therefore, the actual emissions levels of a company in the sector can be expressed as 
et = btqý i% 
Although such a constuction of the model sugests that emissions can be reduced only by 
reducing the output, another way of reducing emissions would be through reducing the rate 
of emissions 6' through R&D in a cleaner technology, for instance. I will discuss this point 
toward the end of the paper, in the policy recomendation section. 
m- is a market price to buy or sell permits to emit 1 tonne of GHG. The price of permits is 
established in the permits market. One of the largest trading platforms for carbon permits is 
the European Energy Exchange. Due to the large number of participants in the daily trade, 
the price of permits is assumed to be exogenous to the companies. 22 
d- a discount factor between two adjusting periods. I assume that d= (0,1) 
9.2 Allocation rule 
Grandfathering is an allocation rule where permits are distributed based on historical emis- 
sion levels. The allocation to each incumbent installation is done according to the following 
is made by Hepburn et al. (2006) 
22Website of European Energy Exchange: http: //www. eex. com/en/ 
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formula: 23 
Incumbent's relevant emissions rt Total incumbent allocation = Sum of relevant emissions of all incumbents in the sector ýD 
(40) 
First, I am introducing a two-period model. In section 3.3 1 will extend the model to 
three periods. 
9.3 Two-period Oligopoly-Benchmark case 
I denote the inverse demand that companies face in the market for their product 
P(Q') = cx, - bQ' 
ci- is the marginal cost of company i to produce one additional unit of output qt. 
7ril-is the profit function of company z in period t. 
In the UK NAP, historic emissions are relevant to the allocation of permits. The policy 
which is adopted in the Second Phase of the UK NAP (2008-2012) is that of a rolling over 
of historic emissions benchmark (i. e. emissions of years 1998-1999 are relevant for permits 
allocation in the First Phase; in the Second Phase the relevant emissions level is rolled over to 
years 2000-2003. To follow this methodology I say that emissions in period (t - 2) determine 
the allocation of permits to the incumbent in period t. For example, if I want to determine 
the relevant allocation for the incumbent in period t=2,1 take its historic emissions level 
in period t=0. 
23Section 3.2 in the UK NAP 
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The profit function 7r'i can be expressed: 
qi -2 
7r'i = [ce 7- bQ'] qi' - cq, -m [5'qi' - -ýjý E'l tI 
L-2 t-2 
The expression 6'q; the difference between the allocated permits El and 
the company's emissions to produce q,. 
The difference between the company's actual allocation and actual emissions results in a 
surplus/deficit of its permits. On one hand, if a company has a surplus of permits it will sell 
them for the price of m. The revenue from selling the permits is a profit to the company that 
outperforms and reduces its emissions level below the initial allocation. On the other hand, 
if the company does not hold enough permits to cover its actual emissions, it can purchase 
additional permits for the price of m. The cost of purchasing additional permits is a 'tax' 
to the company that tmits more that its initial allocation. 
III- is the total profit of company i in period t. I can express the total profit 11ý as a 
discounted sum of all its profits from period t=1 to t=T 
Edt-17rý 
I analyse my problem as a game between N companies. Technically I solve the opti- 
misation problem in the Cournot Oligopoly with two periods. I use a standard method of 
backward induction to find an optimal output in each period t. 
9.3.1 Second period 
Let me denote t=0 as a relevant period for comany's allocation of permits in period t=2. 
E2 is the total number of permits to be distributed among the companies. 
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The maximisation 
2=_ M[62qi2 
1 
21. 
arg max ir [a - 
bQ2]qi2 
- ciqi2 'E q2 i QO 
First order condition: 
d7r,?. 
= ce - b(Q2) - bq? _ Cl. _ Mj2 =0 (42) dqi2 
Summing up N first order conditions, as the number of companies in the sector, J get: 
Nee - (N + 1)b(Q2) _ Eci - Nrn52 =0 (43) 
Optimal total output in the sector in t=2,1 solve Equation (43) for (Q2)* : 
(Q2)* = 
Na - Eci - Nm62 
(N + 1)b 
(44) 
I see that optimal total output is not affected by the future allocation of permits. I derive 
the second order condition to verify the optimal condition for 
Second order condition: 
d2 7rj2 
= -2b <0 d2qi2 (45) 
The second order condition is satisfied, insuring that Equation (44) is the optimal total 
24 output that maximises total profit in period t=2. 
"'As the number of firms in the market increases, the conditions in the market approach the competitive 
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9.3.2 First period 
I use the method of backward induction to find the optimal output in period t=1.1 add the 
discounted profit 7rj2 to the profit 7ril which results in total profit rlil of company i in period 
I denote period t =- -1 as a relevant period for allocation of permits to company in 
period t=1. The maximisation is 
-1 
argmaxrl'=[a-bQ'Jqil-ciqi'-m[blqi'- E'I+d7r2i (47) 
qýl 
iI 
Profit function 7ri does not depend on qj'. Therefore first order condition is II 
dIlý 
dqý a- 
b(Q') - bq, - ci - rnöl =0 (48) 
t 
Summing up N first order conditions and solving for the optimal output in period t=1,1 
get that Q' is identical to 
The optimal output in period t=2: 25 
Na -Z ci - Nrn61 (49) 
(N + 1)b 
equilibrium. The output in the market approaches the competitive output. To find the competitive output 
C is a constant. Otherwise the equation explodes and tends to j'V I have to assume that 
infinity: 
lim Q2 - rnS - N-ý b 
(46) 
MI For the S. O. C please check the solution for the first Second period-Oligopoly. The condition is represented 
by Equation (45). 
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I denote: 
Ql = (Q, )* (50) 
iT = (Q2)* (51) 
To sum up, in the two-period model companies have no incentive to increase their output 
to receive a larger share of permits in the future allocation. Therefore, in the benchmark 
case, a revision cap policy (EI)j) to achieve the target of reducing emissions level can be 
implemented (i. e. as the total production in the sector does not depend on the future policy 
and future cap, a policy maker can revise the cap at each phase individually and set E in a 
way that achieves the desired emissions in the economy in period t). It is done based on the 
emissions projection in that period which is derived from the total estimated output Q'. I 
should note, however, that the former argument is restricted only to myopic companies that 
consider their actions for the nearest future. In the above case there are only two periods. 
For instance, the policy maker in period t=1 would, ideally set up the cap of El to satisfy 
the following equality 
El = JIT ý-- A(61QBAU) 
rearranging I get that 
Ql ý AQBAU 
where AE (0,1) is the parameter indicating the commitment of the policy maker to reduce 
the emissions level, such that A=0 would represent the policy maker who is committed to 
reduce the emissions by 100 per cent. FVrthermore, QBAU is the production in the "business 
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as usual scenario", which stands for production if there is no cap on the emission. The swne 
rule would apply to the cap of period t=2. 
However, companies are not acting myopically and consider their action with respect to 
horizons that are beyond two periods. Two questions naturally arise in this context: 1) 
What happens to total output if one considers a framework of more than two periods? 2) 
Does the UK NAP still fulfil its purpose of eliminating the incentives of companies to act 
strategically? In the following section I address these questions. 
9.4 Three-period oligopoly: uncertainty case 
Although the EU Council adopted a revised ETS plan for the post-Kyoto period in which 
the free allocations are gradually reduced, there is no clear directive on how free allocation 
would be implemented. From now on, therefore, I assume that companies face an uncertain 
allocation rule beyond 2012.1 show the effect of uncertainty on total output. To do so, I 
first extend the benchmaxk model to three periods. Next, I state what the most probable 
allocation policies are for the third period. I also assign probabilities to possible allocation 
scenarios as they are perceived by companies. To conclude this section I compare total 
output under uncertainty with total output under the benchmark model. 
Third period - uncertainty case To analyse the effect of uncertainty on the total 
output in the market I assume that companies consider only two policies of free allocation. 
On one hand, the policy maker continues with rolling over the relevant historic emissions. 
This is a reasonable assumption. In period t=3 emissions level of period t=1 are available 
and show a more updated measure of historic emissions than emissions level of period t=0. 
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On the other hand, the policy maker might adopt more recent emissions levels. Historic 
emissions of period t=2 would become relevant emissions for the allocation of permits in 
period t=3. A reasonable justification for that can be that the policy maker might try to 
diminish companies' incentives to adjust their behaviour in period t=1 to receive a larger 
share of permits in period t=3.26 1 denote p' as a probability that the policy maker assigns 
relevant historic emissions to be in period t such that 
EP t=1. 
The maximisation is 
l 2- 
3_C, Mfj3 ýpj 
qi 
+ P2 arg max 7rý = [ce - bQ'] q jq, qý - 
I'- I E31 (52) 
q, 3 2iI Ql Q2 
First order condition: 
d7ri' 
1 
=a- b(Q') - bqý - ci - 7n63 0 (53) dqý Z 
Summing up N f. o. c. I get that the total output in period t=3 equals 
Q3 = 
Na-Eci-Nm63 
(54) 
(N + 1)b 
To find what the total output is in periods t=1,2 1 proceed, as before, using the standard 
method of backward induction. 
Lemma 6 Let's denote QU as the total output in period t when companies consider an 
uncertain future policy in period t=3 and the policy is uncertain. Total output in periods 
2(5j can also assume that companies can assign probabilities to a policy that assign relevant emissions 
to t=0. However, it will not affect qualitative results, as this option will be discarded in the first order 
condition. I therefore ignore this scenario and concentrate on the two aforementioned scenarios. 
60 
t: <3 increases, so that 
t= 
;T+ (7)2 m(N - 1)E3pt QU -+ 
dT-t > Q. 24 (N + 1)b 
Second period-Uncertainty Case Proof. See Appendix B. I. 1 a 
First period-Uncertainty Case Proof. See Appendix B. 1.2 m 
I conclude that in the presence of uncertainty, total output in the sector increases in 
both periods t=1 andt = 2. This result suggests that companies who consider longer 
horizons policies tend to overproduce to receive a larger share of future permits' allocation - 
the Ratchet Effect. Unlike the benchmark case, the output in the current period (t = 1) is a 
positive function of future allocation E'. Therefore, a policy maker who ignores that effect 
may find it hard to achieve its goal of reducing emissions levels. Only considering short-term 
policy would underestimate the production levels Q' in the economy and consequently miss 
the emissions reduction targets. At this point it is worth mentioning that emission targets 
and CAP should not necessarily coincide. The market for carbon permits is considered 
as an open market. There, the traders from different localities can trade their permits by 
purchasing additional credits at the carbon market (Mackenzie et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
restriction imposed by the domestic policy maker on the em issions CAP does not necessarily 
apply to the domestic companies in the market, as additional credits could be purchased 
in the carbon market and/or reslut forn the market-mechanisms such as CDMs and Jls. 
Therefore, there are situations in which the CAP is not violated, however the emissions 
target set by the policy maker is missed. 
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9.5 Ambiguity vs. uncertainty 
In the previous section I assumed only two scenarios, in which their probabilities were known 
to the companies and the probabilities summing up to one. In reality it is highly unlikely 
that companies know the exact probability distribution of possible future policies. This 
situation of uncertainty is called ambiguity. In ambiguity both possible future policies and 
their expected values are uncertain. In order to study the effect of ambiguity on total output, 
I use a solution method proposed by Schmeidler and Gilboa (1989). However, first I briefly 
introduce the notion of capacity and the Choquet expected value. 
9.5.1 Capacity 
In contrast to standard assumptions on probabilities, capacities (Knightian probabilities) 
assign non-additive weights to possible scenarios. Capacity can be formally represented by 
a real function k which satisfies the following properties (Schmeidler, 1989): 
(a) for two events A, B EQs. t ACB ==*- k(A) < k(B) 
(b) k(O) = 0; 
(c) k(Sl) = 1. 
Capacity is convex if it satisfies: k(A) + k(B) :5 k(A u B) + k(A n B). In this paper'I 
will concentrate on convex capacities. According to Scmeidler and Gilboa (1989) a core 'C' 
of k, where A(h) is the set of all additive probability measures on II: 
C(k) = fp E A(Q) i p(A) ý! k(A) VA C Qj 
meaning that C(k) is the set of all the plausible probabilities that companies may assign to 
future policies. Therefore, k(A) = minpEC(k)p(A). In the presence of ambiguity I assume 
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that companies assign Knightian, non-additive probabilities k' and k' to the same policies 
as they did in the uncertainty case. Non-additive property of convex capacities (E k' < 1) 
reflects ambiguity of the DM. The measure of ambiguity aversion can be represented by 
AA = 1-k'-k 
2. 
The higher the value of AA, the higher the ambiguity aversion of the DM (Dow et al., 
1992). Next, I introduce the concept of E-contamination to show the effect of an increase in 
ambiguity. 
9.5.2 e-contamination 
The behavioural foundation for --contamination can be found in Nishimura et al. (2006) 
and its application to a discrete time search in Nishimura et al. (2004). The concept of e- 
contamination is usually used in the context of Bayesian uncertainty. To deal with Bayesian 
uncertainty a new set of priors is introduced by contaminating one single hypothetical prior 
(Nishimura et aL, 2004). This procedure is often referred to as c-contamination. I also 
follow this technique by contaminating the prior distribution (pl, p2) which I assume in the 
uncertainty case. 
In the previous section I defined capacity as k(A) : -- MinpC-C(k) p(A). I contaminate priors 
(p', p') and set the core to be in the range of C(k) = (p' - -, p' + E), where E>0 is a small 
number. An increase in e can be seen as an increase of ambiguity. An increase in e leads to 
an increase of AA as kt decrease. Companies become more ambiguous regarding the future 
policy, and as a consequence tend to decrease their output. 
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9.5.3 Choquet expected value 
The Choquet integral is accepted as the main tool to evaluate the expected value in case 
of non-additive probabilities (Scmeidler, 1989; Sarin and Wakker, 1992). Schmidler and 
Cimlboa (1989) show that given a convex non-additive probability k, the Choquet expected 
value is a simple minimum of all possible values. In my model companies simply choose the 
lowest possible value for the allocation of permits according to the following formula: 
t=2 t 
CE min qj 
E C(k)) 
EP 
t 
t=l Q 
where -Qq-t is the relevant output ratio for the allocation in period t=3. To find out the 
explicit expression for the Choquet expected value I consider two cases: 
Case 1 For companies whose relative production in period t=1 is higher than in period 
t=2 (t > the Choquet expected value (CE) is 
q, 
122 
ii CE = kl(qi' - 
q' + qi Ql Q2 Q2 
Case 2 For companies whose relative production in period t=1 is lower than in period 
I 2< the Choquet expected value (CE) is 
21q! 
CE =k 
2( W_q; + %_ Q2 Ql Ql 
I have to note that unless F, k' < 1, the two Choquet expected values above coincide. 
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Third period - ambiguity case I assume that the total number of incumbents in period 
21 9 qý 
t=3 who satisfy condition -Q?, jT < --QTequals G. Assuming that total production in period t+1 
is higher than in period t, implies the condition N-G>G. In light of these assumptions I 
distinguish between two maximisations of the incumbent in period t=3. 
I q" 
when q, > QT Q-T: 
- ciqi3 - m[P }E 
3 (55) arg max irý, = (a - bQ3] qý qý - lk' 
ý- + (1 - kl) 
' 
Qi A 
2) when <q 
12 
arg max 7r4 = [a - bQ3]q, 
3 
- cqý - m[J'qi3 - J(l -k 
2) 
_i +k2 
2'ý }E3 (56) 
1z Ql Q2 q, 3 AA 
Total output in period t=3 equals Q' and is represented by Equation (44). 
Proof. See above. m 
Using backward induction I calculate the total output in period t=2 and t=1. 
Proposition 7 Let's denote Qt as the total output in period t when companies consider A 
future policy in period t=3. If the policies in period t=3 are ambiguous, the output in 
period t=1 is higher than in the uncertainty case, such that Q1 > Q1 , and in period t=2 A-U 
is lower than in the uncertainty case, such that Q' < Q' AU 
Second period-Ambiguity Case Proof. See Appendix B. 2.1 m 
First period-Ambiguity Case Proof. See appendix B. 2.2 s 
I show that the total output depends on the subjective beliefs of the companies, specif- 
ically capacities. Given that k(A) = minpc: C(k) p(A) and C(k) = (p' - E, p' + -), I conclude 
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that k' =pl-c andk2 =ý2_6. Using the proposition above I see that under our assump- 
tion the total output in period t=1, when I assume ambiguity, is higher than in the case 
where I assume uncertainty. The result shows that production, under the ambiguity case, 
in period t=2, is smaller than it is under the uncertainty case. It is important to notice, 
however, that my main interest is output in period t=1. 
Given these results, it is clear that under ambiguity the policy maker might find it really 
difficult to achieve the goals of current emissions reduction if it does not account for the 
ambiguity aversion. As a result of higher output under the ambiguity case than under 
the uncertainty case, the emissions are, as a consequence, higher as well. Therefore, as 
suggested in the previous section, only considering short-term policy would underestimate 
the production levels Q1 in the economy and consequently miss the emissions reduction 
targets. As I explain above, there are situations in which the CAP is not violated, however 
the emissions target is missed. 
10 Analysis: increase in uncertainty vs. increase in 
ambiguity 
The effect of an output-based allocation of emissions permits has been already examined by 
Fischer (2001). Fischer, in a simple one-period model, finds that an output-based allocation 
has a smaller impact on the output reduction than a fixed allocation. Similar results were 
also found in the empirical analysis of emissions in the province of Alberta, Canada (Haites, 
2003). However, these results are restricted to one period only. My model presents a more 
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general framework for analysing the impact of output-based allocation on total production. 
I show in the previous section that ambiguity and uncertainty of future free allocation policy 
increases the total output in the sector in comparison with lump-sum allocation. 
Next, I propose an analysis of total output when companies face an increase in ambiguity 
and/or uncertainty 
Proposition 8 Whenever companies face an increase of ambiguity of future policy it leads 
to an increase of current total output, whereas an increase of uncertainty of future policy has 
no effect on current total output. 
Proof. See Appendix B. 3. m 
10.1 Increase of uncertainty 
It is accepted to analyse an increase in uncertainty by a mean-preserving spread technique. 
In my context the new spread preserves the expected value of the expected policy 
( 9ý 
2 
There are two alternatives for possible historic emissions benchmarks A- The Q11 I Q11 
former stands for a policy that considers historical emissions of period t=1, and the latter 
is ( q, 
1 
of period t=2. The spread -Q, + + 0, -1-2! PrO). 
Parameter 0 is interpreted as an 
additional factor to future policies. For instance, policy makers can change the number of 
total permits to be distributed in the sector, this way adjusting to updated information 
regarding the environmental impacts. It can also represent an additional tax or subsidy 
that policy makers can impose on companies that are subject to cap and trade of emissions 
permits. Proposition 3 shows that the total output in period t<3 is not affected by an 
increase of uncertainty. An increase in ambiguity, however, produces a different effect. 
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10.2 Increase of ambiguity 
An increase in ambiguity leads to an increase in total output. By employing the concept of 
e-contamination I can show that an increase in - can be seen as an increase in ambiguity. 
Companies become more ambiguous regarding the future policy of free allocation. Next, I 
analyse the scenario where ambiguity aversion (AA) increases because of higher contamina- 
tion e in the priors. This setting indicates that total output in period t=1 increases as a 
result of a high degree of AA. 
11 Policy recommendations 
In this section I describe some of the policy implications. I show that whenever there is 
uncertainty in the market regarding the future policy, it tends to affect the total output in 
the market. Companies tend to increase their output when they face an uncertain. future 
policy. For instance, in the UK alone, emissions to cap ratio has risen from 15 per cent in 
2005 to 19.5 per cent in 2007. These figures show that the UK industry increases its emissions 
beyond the initial allocation. My model can suggest that the rise in the emissions-to-cap 
ratio is driven by behavioural biases. And if I am right in my predictions, then it seems 
that the role of the policy maker is to eliminate such behavioural biases. This conclusion 
corresponds with the environmental literature and the latest draft of the EU ETS. For 
example, a similar idea is proposed by Baldursson et al. (2004). The authors suggest that 
in the presence of uncertainty in the market, policy makers should favour tax regulations 
on emissions rather than issuing transferable permits, as the former regime has a smaller 
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effect on companies' behaviour. In other words, policy makers should favour a regime that 
diminishes behavioural biases of companies. To conclude, I suggest some policy implications. 
11.1 Information certainty 
When the decision maker's state of mind is ambiguous the choices are made with caution 
in response to the imprecise knowledge of probability distribution (Mukerji, 1998). Such 
behaviour creates a bias toward the decision which is based upon the magnitude of certainty 
of the outcome rather than its magnitude. As I show in my previous analysis, ambiguity 
of future policy causes the decision maker to to be cautious with respect to future policy 
and increases current total output in comparison with the lump-sum allocation (Benchmark 
case), in case the future allocation of pernits is based upon the current output. In addition, 
I show that an increase in ambiguity tends to increase the total output. One of the possible 
interpretations of an increase in ambiguity is that there is high information uncertainty 
regarding the future free allocation rule. The higher the information uncertainty in future 
policy, the higher the current total output and emissions level. Therefore, the policy maker 
should try and reveal its long-term policy. This way it contributes to a decrease of total 
output in the economy and subsequently makes it possible for achieving emission reduction 
ta. rgets. 
As I pointed out, companies are not aware of the correct probability distribution of the 
potential free allocation policy. In other words, companies' state of mind is of ambiguity 
rather than of uncertainty. Therefore, the policy maker can affect the company's state of 
mind by reducing the ambiguity of the future policy. This can be done by signalling what 
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the future allocation policy is expected to be. Correct signalling might eliminate strategic 
behaviour or at least diminish behavioural biases of companies and achieve the desired policy 
goal. 
For instance, if policy makers wanted to encourage lower output in the market, they could 
release information regarding the future policy that should decrease the contamination e. 
According to the model, such signalling decreases total output in the sector. 
Frequent press releases that indicate what future policies might be, can decrease com- 
panies' ambiguity. Indeed, the EU Commission and member states periodically issue press 
releases regarding future environmental policies. Such releases include NAPs, guidelines and 
the goals of future policies. 27 The EU uses signalling as a tool. However, it is not clear 
whether the use of signalling is aimed to modify beliefs or merely to provide information. 
It is clear, however, that policy makers could use signalling to produce desirable outcomes. 
It is especially useful, as I show in the analysis above, when one deals with environmental 
policies. 
However, information revelation by the policy maker can be problematic, as shown by 
Walker et al. (1977) in the framework of using standard tax system in pollution control. In 
addition, information release to the market can decrease the ambiguity although it will not 
eliminate it entirely. New information can be interpreted differently by different decision 
makers. The effect on the ambiguity decrease will be i4terpreted differently on different 
individuals. Therefore, the tool of informartion certainty has a somewhat limited effect on 
derninishing the output. Next, I discuss additional tools which can have a more profound 
27 http: //ec. europa. eu/environment/climat/emission/2nd_phase_ep. htm 
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effect on diminishing the output and decreasing the ambiguity bias. 
11.2 Diminishing allocation 
In the model I show that the total output in the sector is a function of the future allocation 
of permits E3. In addition to the information disclosure discussed earlier, the policy maker 
could diminish the effect of the future allocation on present production by reducing the 
E3 variable. This can be done in two ways. On one hand, policy makers may gradually 
3 reduce the number of permits that are distributed for free, namely E. One can increase the 
number of permits for an auction instead of offering them for free distribution. This way the 
permits are allocated to companies that value them the most. Moreover, the revenue earned 
from auctioning can be allocated to researching and developing environmentally friendly 
technologies that can reduce GHG. Similar views are advocated by 13ovenberg et at. (2005), 
Quirion (2003) and Hepburn et al. (2006). In reality, this corresponds to current trends in 
the EU's environmental policies. Similar suggestions are found in the EU's climate-energy 
legislative package from 6 April 2009. In this package the EU sets out to gradually reduce 
the permits that are distributed for free. 
Although there is litterature to support the adoption of auctions instead of free alloca- 
tions, the mechanism has additional difficulties. In order to construct an efficient auction 
mechanism, ambiguity aversion of the auction participant should be taken into account as it 
may arise there as well. As a result, there might be strategic bidding and revenue losses to 
the participants of the auctions. Where the seller in the auction is ambiguity averse, it may 
impose loses on the seller, in our case the policy maker, when the seller is ambiguis to the 
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startegic biding of the permit buyer (Turocy, 2008). If the buyers are ambigous as to the 
valuation of other bidders then the bids tend to be lower, which can achieve a suboptimal 
price of the permits (Chen et al., 2007). 
11.3 Clean technology 
The results above indicates that in an ideal scenario policy makers should set up a cap on 
the emissions that correspond to the optimal production and marginal rate of emissions, 
formally E' = j3Q3. It seems that another way of diminishing the effect of future policy on 
3 current production is by reducing the future marginal rate of emissions, 6. This way policy 
makers should achieve the goals: first, expected growth of production to the future level of 
Q3, second, fulfilling its targets of reducing emissions level. 
In order to reduce the future marginal rate of emissions policy makers should encourage 
R&D in cleaner technologies which could potentially provide companies with environmentally 
friendly production processes. 
12 Conclusion 
In this paper I analyse the effect of ambiguity on total output. I show that in the presence 
of ambiguity or uncertainty with output-based allocation, companies tend to increase their 
production compared to the fixed allocation. Similar results are pointed out by Mackenzie 
et al. (2008). The authors show that in the presence of historical base grandfathering it will 
generate intertemporal distortion of companies incentive and they tend to produce beyond 
social optimum. This paper comes as an extension to the results acheived there by showing 
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that by adding ambiguity in the rule governing the permit allocation in the future can 
potentially increase the production even beyond the production derived under intertemporal 
grandfathering. 
Related literature on the uncertain future abatement tax policy shows that under un- 
certain times and magnitude of a tax policy can have a dramatic effect on the abatement 
investment of the pollutors (Frazin et al., 2000). Similarly, in this paper, I pointed out that 
decreasing ambiguity has a diminishing effect on the total output. In the analysis of these 
results I point out how the former result can be used by policy makers. They might achieve 
high rates of productivity and emissions abatement. Despite the generality of my model it 
has only a few shortcomings, which can be seen as potential subjects for future research. One 
possible extension would be to account for companies' heterogeneity in ambiguity perception. 
Some may say that small or new companies axe more vulnerable to changes in ambiguity, 
whereas large companies are less vulnerable. To see the effect of the production on the price 
structure, one should endogenise the price of permits. While I assumed an identical number 
of new entrants and closures at each period, one could think of a heterogeneous number 
of new entrants and closures. Another potential extension can be made by introducing an 
equilibrium condition for the permits market into the model. I assume that each sector is a 
price taker. However, if the sector is large enough, this assumption is no longer valid as the 
sector's demand for permits could potentially affect permits prices. Despite the mentioned 
shortcoming of the model, it sheds some light on the output determination in the EU ETS. 
In structural terms, my paper solves the three-period Oligopoly model with ambiguity. 
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13 Appendix B 
13.1 Proof of Lemma 6 
13.1.1 Second period total output 
Assuming that I have the value of the total output which maximises the third period profit, 
can plug it as given into r1i' ( the total profit function of the second period). 
Maximisation is 
0 
._ M[62qi Q2 ]qi2 _ C. 
22 2)] (57) arg max [ce -b &qi QO q2 u 
L(E + drtý 
first order condition equals 
dr12 Q2 2 
U-q; 
2=a- bQ2 - bqi2 _ Cl. _ Mj2 + dmE 
3P2 
= 0. (58) TU (Q2 )2 qU 
summing up N f. o. c., as the number of the companies in the market, sums up to 
Na - (N + 1)bQ2U - ci - 
NMj2 +d rnE3P 
2 
(N - 1) = 0. (Q2 U), 
rearranging 
Q2 
;T (T)2 ' (N - 1)E3 p2 
u=2+4+ 
in 
(N + 1)b 
> (59) 
13.1.2 First period total output 
Maximisation is 
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arg max rIl = [a - bQ'j qi' - c, qil -m [51 ql 
0 
iu- -ý! Elj + dri? ql 0 (60) 
IQ 
solving for the value of Q1 I get U 
1 )2 
a(N 1)E3pl Q+ d2 u+ 
F41 )2 , Q 
2 ýN + -I)b 
13.2 Choquet expected value (CE) 
> q, 
2 
, 
CE 1. Given that q-' -, f is QT Q 
CE min 
t=2 
qit min (p, qjI 
2 
+ pl) E C(k)) 
Ep 
-Qt 1E C(k)) Ql Q2 t=l AA 
minpl 22 ( qil q; )+ q; 
G C(k)) Ql Q2 Q2 
qjI 2 kl( _ 
qj2 
)+ qj Ql Q2 Q2 
2 2. Given that ', < '72, CE is Ql Q2 
min 
t=2 
qi min 12 CE P2)_ýi + p2 q; E C(k)) EP-Qt 
(p2 
E C(k)) Ql T2 t=l AA 
min p2 211 
))(q; 
i qj )+ qj 2E C(k Q2 Ql Qj 
k 2( 
q? qil + qil Q2 Ql Qj 
13.3 Proof of Proposition 7 
13.3.1 Second period total output 
Maximisation incumbents is 
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arg max H? = [a - bQ2 I qi2 - ciqi2 _ M[62 q? - -2'1 E 
21 + dir4 (62) 
0 
2A QOI 91 
q2 
--T ý is first order condition of incumbents which satisfy the condition of ', --T Q<Q 
dril 
Q2) 2_C, _ Mj2 
32 
Q2A - qi2 
= dq? =a-b( A- 
bqt + dmE k (Q2)2 
0 (63) 
9A 
2 
first order condition of incumbents which satisfy the condition of 
q W IS r -Q) 
dri, 
2_C, 
_ M62 
3(l 
Q2A -q j2 
= -=a- bQA - bqi2 + dmE - kl) 0 (64) dq-2 Q2 2 iA 
Summing up N f. o. c. sums up to 
--z N-G 0 
Na - (N + 1)bQ2 c, - 
NMj2 +d mE- (Q2 - qi2)k2 + 
E(Q2 
- q, 2)(1 - kl)} =0 A (Q2 )2 AA A 
iI. 2 
,np2 
minp p2 given that kl = (pm -C(k)) = Pl and k p2EC(k) -EI get 
Q2 2 mE 
3 N-C G 
{E (Q2 _ 
2)(p2_e)+E(Q2 
_ 
2)(l_pl+e)l =0 Na-(N+l)b A 
Eci-Nm6 +dTýQý qi qi 
Ap 
AA 
A 
rearranging 
1)bQ2 2 mE3 
N-C 
2) (p2 
G 
-(N+ - NmJ +d 72 {E (Q2 _6)+E(Q2 (p2+6)} =0 Na A)A qt -q? ) -ECi QAi T( A 
if N-G>G, Yget 
Q2 52 
E3 C N-G 
Na-(N+l)b A _E ci-Nm +d 
m J(NQ2 _Q2 (p2)+(I: (Q2 - q? ) - 
1: (Q2 _qi2))C} =0 (Q2 )2 A A) AA 
A 
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Na - (N + 1)bQ2 - 
E: ci - Nrn52 +d 
rnE3(N - 1)ý2 > 0, (65) A Q2 A 
solving Equation (65) 1 get that QA is 
Q2 
T (ZF)2 m(N - 1)E3p2 
A< -2 + -4 +d 2(N + 1)b 
13.3.2 First period total output 
Maximisation of incumbents is 
-1 
arg max rl! = [a - bQl Jqil - ciqi' - m[5'qil - ! L-E'l + drI? (66) q, l IA Q-1 t 
%, q2 . first order condition of companies which satisfy the condition of QT < -Q, 4T is 
drP 
= ce - bQ' - bqi' - ci - mV +d2 mE 
3(l 
-k 
2)QA - qil =0 (67) -ýq-ýl A (Q 
A 
)2 
first order condition of comapnies which satisfy the condition of ', ' > 
q, 2 is 
QT Q7 
drl' 
=a- bQl - bql - ci - mbl + d2mE 3 kl 
QA - qil 
=0 (68) dqi' A (Q A )2 
Summing up N f. o. c. sums up to 
3 N-G G 
2 mE 1 1)(1 2)+E(Ql Na-(N+l)bQA-Ecj-Nm. J1+d2TQ-ý-l -q, -k -qý)kl} =0 (69) 
Ap 
(QA A A 
given that k' =( 
min pl ) =P, -c and k' =( 
minp2 
PIEC(k) Pý2EC(k)) eI get 
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Q2 _12 
mE 3 
N-C G 
Na-(N+l)b A 
Eci-Nmb +d TQ7, {E(Ql -qý)(p'+c)+j: (Ql -qil)(pl-c)} =0 AA 
AA 
(70) 
rearranging 
Na - (N + 1)bQ' - 
Eci 
- Nm5l + d2 
mE3(N - 1)pl ,: ý 0 A Ql A 
solving Equation (71) 1 get that Q': A 
T (T)2 
m(N - 1)E3pl > T+ + d2 =Ql (72) (QA 4 2(N + 1)b u 
13.4 Proof of Proposition 8 
Substituting spread allocation with an additional parameter 0 to Equation (?? ) has no effect 
on the maximisation in period t=3, as the parameter 0 cancels out. Therefore, an increase 
of uncertainty has no effect on the total output in the sector. However, in the case of 
ambiguity, increase of ambiguity has a different effect on total output. 
An increase of parameter c decreases Equation (70) and it becomes even less than In- 
equality (71) 
mE'(N - 1)pl < Na - (N + 1)bQ' ci - Nmöl + d2 <0 Qi A 
as a result the value of QA increases beyond its value in Inequality (72) 
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(Ql)** Ql (-QT) 
2 m(N - 1)E3pl 
A >> 2+4+ 
d2 
2(N + 1)b 
( 1)** 1)* QA > (QA 
Therefore, the total effect on QA is positive as e increases. 
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Chapter 3: Disposition in the carbon market and insti- 
tutional constraints 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the impact of banking and submission constraints, set by 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme, on the efficiency of the carbon permits spot market 
using intra-daily data. My aim is to identify whether there is a Disposition effect in 
the spot market. I will examine a data set that includes spot prices for the First and 
Second Phases of the Scheme from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009.1 find that the 
Disposition effect is significantly high at the beginning of each Phase and decreases 
close to the first compliance event. In the light of these results I propose a lifting of 
the ban on banking between Phases and an increased emissions information disclosure 
in order to increase the efficiency of the Scheme. 
14 Introduction 
The aim of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is to set up a platform for 
achieving a target reduction of C02 emissions in the most efficient way. In order to achieve 
the emissions target, each installation receives carbon permits on a yearly basis, which can 
be traded at one of the existing environmental trading platforms. The permits are valid only 
within the allocated Phase, and banking of permits between phases is not allowed. 28 By 
the end of March installations are required to submit enough permits to cover their yearly 
28The First Phase covers the period form 2005 to 2007; the Second Phase covers the period from 2008 to 
2012. 
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en-dssions. These institutional constraints allow installations to plan their investments and 
to also neutralise the irregularities of C02 emission levels within each Phase. 
However, such institutional constraints have also a negative effect on the efficiency of 
the market. Daskalakis et al. (2008) suggest that the behaviour of the carbon market is 
not consistent with weak-form efficiency according to which all the information contained in 
past prices is reflected in the current price. The authors demonstrate that permit returns are 
serially predictable and that simple trading strategies can be employed in order to produce 
substantial profits. The authors argued that one of the reasons that the carbon market is 
not efficient could be due to the restrictions imposed on permits banking. Spot prices for 
caxbon permits also exhibit high volatility, where the highest decline followed the release of 
verified emissions in April 2006. Betz et aL (2006) suggest that spot price volatility has a 
profound impact on long-term investment risk and in turn can also affect the efficiency of 
the carbon market. 
These institutional constraints can, therefore, have a potential negative effect on carbon 
market efficiency. Despite the importance of the topic, there is a scarcity of literature 
that analyses the role of institutional constraints in price dynamics and carbon market 
efficiency. Borak et al. (2006) find an overall increasing price volatility with an increase 
in maturity. These surprising results contradict the time to maturity effect that suggests 
a decline of price volatility as maturity increases. According to the authors these findings 
suggest that there is a high uncertainty in the market, which can result from the uncertainty 
with regard to the future allocation of the permits. Daskalakis et al. (2009) suggest, without 
providirig empirical evidence, that the prohibition of banking permits between phases can 
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have significant implications on the pricing of permits derivatives. The authors propose to 
lift the ban on banking in order to decrease the uncertainty in the market. Unrestricted 
banking, in their opinion, increases efficiency in the market and leads to emissions reduction 
at the least possible cost. Chevallier et al. (2008) show that in the caxbon market there is 
a relation between the institutional constraints and the modification of investors' subjective 
beliefs. The authors found a significant change in the risk aversion of traders in April 2006, 
when the actual figures on emissions were first published. However, the above studies do 
not provide an explanation for how those institutional constraints affect the evolution of the 
carbon permits price. 
It is worth mentioning, however, those few studies that investigate the evolution of the 
carbon permits price. Bunn and Fezzi (2007) show that the price of permits and the price 
of energy in the UK have a major role in formulating each others' equilibrium price. The 
authors indicate that the permits price reacts quickly to shocks in gas prices; however, the 
pass through of shock in permits price to the electricity market is much slower. Extreme 
weather conditions are identified as one of the fundamental factors that determine permits 
price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007). Indeed, extreme temperatures affect the demand for 
energy. For instance, in cold winters there is an increased demand for heating. As a result, 
power generators increase their emissions and in turn the demand for permits increases as 
well. The significant effect of industrial indices on the determination of permits price is 
demonstrated by Alberola et al. (2007). The authors show that the price of permits reacts 
to the economic activity of the main sectors that are covered by the ETS. They point out 
that the announcement of the European Commission on verified emissions in 2006 revealed 
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that prior to the announcement, trading had been based more on anticipation rather than 
the fundamental price mechanism. Benz et al. (2009) propose that due to different regimes 
in carbon price and volatility behaviour of returns, the AR-GARCH model outperforms 
constant volatility models. 
Although the carbon permit is not a pure financial commodity in the usual sense as it 
expires at the end of each Phase, there seems to be a general consensus that it should be 
studied as such (among others see Kosobud et al., 2002, Daskalakis et al., 2009, Benz et al., 
2009). Explanations of the anomalies in the financial market can, therefore, assist in clari- 
fying the role of the financial institutions' constraints in the context of the carbon market. 
One of the extensive fields of empirical finance incorporates psychological biases into the 
analysis of investment decision making. One of the most documented psychological anom- 
alies in financial literature is that of the Disposition effect. Disposition-prone investors tend 
to hold on to their losing assets, and realise their winning assets (Shefrin et al., 1985). This 
tendency contradicts the rational behaviour of the market, where investors hold their win- 
ning assets and get rid of their losing assets. Another documented anomaly is the tendency 
of investors not to react to news, which creates a drift in price and return predictability. 
The risk aversion of the Prospect Theory type (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) together with 
mental accounting explains both the Disposition effect (Grinblatt and Han, 2005) and the 
delayed reaction to news in the market (Frazzini, 2006). 
In the light of the existing literature it seems that there is a place to analyse the effect of 
the Prospect type risk aversion, specifically the Disposition effect, on the pricing mechanism 
of carbon permits. I will contribute to the existing literature by evaluating the link between 
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institutional constraints and the Disposition effect in the carbon market. I will investigate 
whether there is a change in the DispositioiP effect around compliance events of the First 
and Second Phases and towards the end of the First Phase. To perform my analysis I use 
a data set of intraday data from the BlueNext exchange platform (BlueNext Spot EUA 
05-07, BlueNext Spot EUA 08-12, BlueNext Spot CER) a historical transactions data set 
recorded since 24 June 2005. Unlike Benz et al. (2009) and Chevallier et al. (2008) who 
use the GARCH process, I will use the ARMA process, which delivers estimations without 
remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. I will also use an additional dummy variable 
of capital gains that captures the Disposition effect in the market. To construct a capital 
gains variable I will follow a methodology proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005). The 
authors show that disposition behaviour, where investors tend to hold their losing assets, 
has a predictive power on future returns. The use of high frequency data is necessary for a 
reasonable approximation of capital gains (Grinblatt and Han, 2005). High frequency data 
allows me to trace changes in Disposition that occur during the daily trade. 
My findings suggest that the Disposition effect holds throughout the two sample periods. 
I have found that the Disposition effect significantly decreases after April 2006 and 2007, after 
the publication of verified emissions by the European Commissioner. These findings suggest 
that the compliance event that occurs between March and April has a significant effect on 
shaping the behaviour of market participants. Specifically, the availability of information 
on total emissions contributes to the rational behaviour of the carbon maxket participants. 
My findings also show that after the first compliance event of the Second Phase the Disposi- 
tion effect stabilises and remains constant throughout the rest of the period. These findings 
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strengthen the argument that the first compliance event has a significant effect on the evo- 
lution of the carbon spot price and in turn the efficiency of the carbon market. Opposed to 
the proposition of Daskalakis et al. (2009), however, my finding shows no evidence of the 
effect of banking constraints on the risk perception in the market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the EU ETS 
structure, the BlueNext exchange platform and the data. Section 3 specifies the econometric 
model and discusses the results. I will also perform a robustness analysis of the results where 
various specifications of model and independent variables yield similar qualitative results. 
In section 4,1 will test the relevance of institutional constraints in the context of the carbon 
market and provide policy recommendations. In Section 51 present my conclusions. 
15 EU ETS and BlueNext 
The EU has introduced the Emission Trading Scheme to comply with the international 
ernissions target cornrrýitrnent set by the Kyoto Protocol. The ETS is the first trading scherne 
to operate on the international scale so as to tackle global warming concerns. Each member 
state in the EU can achieve its obligations of reducing the total national emissions by using 
one of the flexible mechanisms set by the Protocol. Permits trading is one among the three 
mechanisms. " The first trade in carbon permits took place in 2005, three years prior to 
the protocol commitment period. The first three years of the scheme operation, which are 
usually referred to as First Phase (2005-2007), were aimed at adjusting the market to the 
211 Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are additional mechanisms that aim to reduce 
emissions through projects that reduce emissions in foreign countries. 
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emissions trade and smoothing the transactions of the market to the Protocol commitment 
period. This corresponds to the Second Phase (2008-2012) of the ETS. Each member state 
submits, prior to each Phase, its National Allocation Plan for approval by the European 
High Commissioner. The purpose of a NAP is to describe the allocation rules that govern 
the initial allocation of permits to installations, and the total Of C02 that member states 
are to extract during each Phase. The total of emissions is referred to as a cap. 
Most of the states chose to allocate their cap according to a relative historical benchmark, 
a method often labelled as grandfathering. For instance, according to the UK NAP for 
the Second Phase, allocation to installations is based on their relative production prior 
to the Phase, specifically during the period 2003-2005.3" Each permit allows extracting one 
tonne of C02 during the allocated Phase. An allocated permit expires at the end of each 
Phase, and the owner of the permit cannot bank it to cover emissions that are generated 
in a different Phase. 3' The member states allocate permits to installations on a yearly 
basis, and the latter must submit enough permits to cover their yearly emissions. In April, 
when the submission process is over, the European High Commissioner publishes the verified 
figures of emissions for the previous year. 32 The trade of the permits is open to the public. 
However, only a few sectors are covered by the NAPs. Only those installations whose historic 
production/emissions are above a predetermined threshold have to submit permits to cover 
1OFor a detailed description of NAP of the member states please visit the EU website: 
http: //ec. europa. eu/environment/cli mat/emission 
_plans. 
htm. htm 
3'However, banking within the Phase is permitted. 
32jt is evident that the allocation of allowances for the First Phase of EU ETS has been too generous, as it 
is argued by environmental groups. This argument is debated by Ellerman and Buchner (2008). The authors 
argue that installations that abate for profit purposes would be considered as being in excess of permits. 
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their emissions. 
There are currently a few trading platforms that allow the trade of emissions permits. 
Futures, options and Certified Emission Reduction (CER)33 are among the possible trading 
opportunities, in addition to the spot market available to traders. BlueNext Spot EUA is 
one of the leading spot exchanges for EU caxbon permits with over 60 per cent of the market 
share in the spot exchange. It was founded by NYSE Euronext and Caisse des Depots, in 
December 2007. It consists of 101 members and has a 95 per cent market share. Futures and 
spots on EU permits as well as CER are traded on BlueNext. Cash held on account earns 
an interest rate of the Euro Overnight Index Average minus an eighth. The price tick is 0.01 
E/t, and the minimum price is 0.01 46/t. The volume tick is 1,000 tons and the minimum 
volume tick is 1,000 tons. Its trading hours are between 8: 00 AM to 5: 30 PM (UTC+I), 
from Monday to Riday. The delivery and settlement operated by BlueNext is in real time. 
Delivery consists of the transfer of the underlying permits from the seller's account to the 
buyer's account via a BlueNext transit account in the French registry for the EUA. 34 
15.1 Data description and regression 
My data consists of a data set provided by BlueNext. The data set contains data of the spot 
prices and traded volumes of permits, including information about the date, time of trade 
and traded volume. The data is an irregular spread in time intra daily closing spot price 
from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009 amounting to total of 40,339 observations. The'data 
set include data on permits for the First (BlueNext Spot EUA 05-07) and Second Phases 
33For more information on CER please see: http: //unfccc. int/2860. php. 
"The complete description of BlueNext is available at http: //www. bluenext. eu/. 
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(BlueNext Spot EUA 08-12), as well as sorne observations on CERs. I have divided the data 
set into two sets with observations related to the First and Second Phases. I do so in order 
to identify the effect of psychological biases on the price of permits for the First in contrast 
to the Second Phases. After excluding from the data set observations related to trade of 
CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution of permits, the total number of 
observations is 37,924. 
I denote Pt to be the spot price of carbon permit observation at time t. The log returns 
of carbon spot prices at time t is rt = log In order to account for high trading activity 
during the opening and closure of the market, I consider volatility adjusted returns Ft LL ST 
where ST denotes standard deviation of returns on the day rt is observed. This way I 
construct a time series of standardised. returns for the First and Second Phases, where the 
former consists of 4,927 and the latter of 32,997 observations. Figures 1 and 2 display the 
series of standardised log returns for both the First and Second Phases, respectfully. 
16 Disposition effect 
In this section I will test whether in the market for carbon permits there exists a significant 
Disposition effect on the dynamics of carbon log returns. " In what follows, I describe the 
capital gain specification of Grinblatt and Han (2005) and the statistical model. I conclude 
this section by performing a robust analysis which shows that my findings are robust to a 
different sampling, model and variable specification. 
M' For evidence of the effect of psychological bias on the dynamics of prices in emerging markets see, among 
others, Tan et al., 2008 and Chen et al., 2007. 
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Table 1 documents the sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, 
skewness and kurtosis of the standardised log returns variable Ft. In the First Phase the 
log returns variable exhibits a slight deviation from the normal distribution by displaying a 
slight positive excess kurtosis, due to the high concentration of log returns around zero. In 
addition, log returns in the First Phase exhibit a slight positive skew. In contrast, in the 
Second Phase the standardised. log returns exhibit a very high positive skew as well as a 
high kurtosis in comparison to the First phase. This may be due to a higher concentration 
of positive log returns in the Second Phase. Table I also reports a significantly high positive 
autocorrelation in the first lag for both First and Second Phases. There is no evidence for 
volatility clustering in the standardised log returns (Figures I and 2) in contrast to normal 
log returns (Figure 3 and 4). The latter suggests that volatility clustering in the log returns 
is mainly due to different regimes in daily trading activity. 
I employ an ARMA specification to account for the autocorrelation. in the log returns and 
unobserved shocks in the market. I will also consider a dummy variable for capital gains, 
which I will construct using a method similar to the one used by Grinblatt and Han (2005). 
As in Grinblatt and Han, I will construct a costs basis Rt as a proxy for the reference price 
of the permits portfolio. However, I lack the information on the real identity of the permit 
holders. To overcome this obstacle, Grinbaltt and Han suggest that Rt can be approximated 
00 n-1 
1) Pt 
n-I 
"E 
(V 
V by Rt t-njj[1 - 
VIt-n+T 
ni where Vt-nll[l t-n+7-1 is a probability that a 
n=1 r=l r=l 
permit has been purchased at date t-n and Vt is a turnover ratio. 'However, unlike Grinbaltt 
and Han, I propose an alternative proxy for the turnover variable Vt at each point of time 
t. The proxy that I -will use consists of the total number of traded permits the day the 
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observation t is taken and the total number of traded permits at each observation point t. 
Vt is the proxy for turnover ratio, which represents the probability of buying an additional 
asset and is expressed in the following manner: 
Vt = 
Total of traded permits at each observation point t 
Total of traded permits the day observation t is taken 
I define capital gains gt at time t as the log of the spot price of carbon permit Pt and the 
reference price Rt, which is gt = log --L. Similar to Grinblatt and Han (2005) 1 employ Rt. 
gt-l instead of gt in the regression so as to avoid market microstructure effect, such as bid- 
ask bounce. To evaluate the Disposition effect in the carbon market, I have employed an 
ARMA(1,1) specification where I include the capital gain proxy variable gt. This gives way 
to 
rt = +agt-l + Ort-I + Et + ýpEt-j (73) 
where et is fid. The capital gains coefficient a represents the Disposition effect on the logre- 
turns. According to the theoretical framework of Grinblatt and Han (2005), the Disposition 
effect prevails in the market if the coefficient a>0. 
16.1 Estimation results 
I estimate by least-squares Equations (73) for the series of log returns for the First and 
Second Phases. I report the results in Table 3.1 have employed the ARMA(1,1) process, as 
the latter copes better with autocorrelation in the residuals than the AR(I) process. The 
Q-statistics of the Ljung-Box test (1978) show that an MA(l) component is necessary to 
cope with the first order autoregressive structure in the log returns for two Phases. The 
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results of the Ljung-Box test (1978) show no evidence of a remaining autocorrelation in the 
residuals up to the 13th order. I proceed, therefore, to the analysis of the estimates. All of 
the coefficients reported in Table 3 are significant. 
Table 3 also reports that there is a significant momentum which arises from the strategies 
that form portfolios from the first autoregressive, and moving average components 0 and W, 
respectively. However, the most important result comes from the variable of capital gains. 
The significant coefficient of oe suggests that there is a significant positive effect on the 
returns coming from the capital gains variable. This is consistent with the Disposition effect 
reported by Grinblatt and Han (2005). Altogether, my findings indicate that during the 
First and Second Phases of ETS the price of carbon permits is affected by the Disposition 
tendency of traders in the market. 
16.2 Robustness analysis 
To evaluate the sensitivity of my findings I will perform a robustness analysis of the predicted 
coefficient on capital gains. In particular, I will test whether there are qualitative changes 
in the coefficient due to variations in the sample period, capital gains variable and model 
specifications. First, I will divide the data set into five subsamples: 2005,2006,2007,2008 
and 2009. The main goal is to show that during all the sub-periods of First and Second Phases 
of the Scheme capital gains have a significant positive effect on the log returns. Results of 
the Ljung-Box test (1978) in Table 4 show no evidence for the remaining autocorrelation 
in the residuals. The capital gains variable is still positive ý, nd significant. This suggests 
that my findings are robust to the sampling of the data. Another interesting feature of the 
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subsample results is that there is a significantly high effect coming from the capital gains at 
the beginning of the each Phase. These latter findings may suggest that during the first year 
of each Phase market participants, on average, axe more Disposition-prone than during the 
rest of the Phase. This may be due to the novelty of the market and/or commodity during 
the First Phase and the lack of information on the commodity price fundamentals during 
the Second Phase. As the market becomes more mature, the Disposition effect diminishes. 
Secondly, I will consider an alternative capital gains variable that tests the sensitivity 
of my results to a different specification of the capital gains variable. To construct a new 
reference, instead of using reference Rt, I will set my reference to be a maximum past price 
(Heath et al., 1999). 1 will take a maximum of the past 30 observations to be my alternative 
reference Wt = MaX(Pt-30; Pt-1). The new capital gains variable is, therefore, log f4 Rt 
Table 4 shows that the alternative specification of the capital gains does not affect the 
qualitative result which suggests that the capital gains variable is positive and significant in 
both Phases. I, therefore, conclude that the significant predictive power of the capital gains 
is not an artefact of the way I have constructed it. 
Thirdly, I will test whether my results are due to the stanclaxclisation of log returns. Table 
2 documents the sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, skewness 
and kurtosis of the log returns variable ri. The log returns variable exhibits a positive excess 
kurtosis both in the First and Second Phases, due to the high concentration of log returns 
around zero. In addition, log returns in the First Phase exhibit negative skew, due to a 
larger concentration of negative log returns. However, in the Second Phase the log returns 
exhibit positive skew, due to a larger concentration of positive log returns. Table 2 also 
95 
reports significantly high positive autocorrelation, in the first two lags for First and Second 
Phases (in addition to the volatility clustering which is evident from Figure 3 and 4). 1 will, 
therefore, employ an ARMA(l, l)-GARCH specification to estimate the evolution of carbon 
spot log returns similar to Benz et al., (2009) who consider AR-GARCH and Borak et al., 
(2006) who consider MA-GARCH specifications. I will employ an ARMA(l, l)-GARCH(l, l) 
specification to account for the autoregressive component in addition to volatility clustering 
in the log returns. As before, I will include the capital gain variable gt. This gives way to 
rt = ao + +cilgt + olrt-I + ct + VIEt-I (74) 
Ct : -- Utat (75) 
CT 
2= 00 + 0162 1 +020,2 (76) t t- t-I 
where et - iid(O, 1). Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (74). Although 
the ARMA-GARCH specification cannot cope with autocorrelation in the residuals, the 
overall results indicate that there is a significant Disposition effect in the market both in the 
First and the Second Phases. 
To conclude, my results provide robust evidence of the Disposition effect in the carbon 
market during the First and Second Phases. It is my next task to provide an explanation 
as to the cause of such an effect and how to diminish it. In the next section I suggest that 
the institutional constraints of the Scheme are the main cause for increasing the Disposition 
effect in the market. 
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17 Institutional Constraints 
In this section I will estimate Equation (73) for changes in the capital gains variable due to 
institutional constraints. The most important institutional features of the ETS are twofold: 
firstly, there is a statutory obligation for installations to submit their verified emissions by 
the end of March each year. The installations are obliged to submit enough permits to cover 
their yearly emissions. By the end of April, actual emissions figures are revealed to the 
market. The market, however, learns of the actual emissions prior to the publication of the 
actual emissions when the market is updated with the actual emissions figures. From the 
demand for permits in the carbon market, the traders can learn whether the market has a 
surplus or deficit of permits. If there is, therefore, a strong signal in the market of the real 
value of the permits, it can diminish the effect of psychological biases on the carbon price 
during and/or after the publication of official figures for the total emissions levels. 
Secondly, there is a ban on permits banking between First and Second Phases. 36 ere 
is an argument in the literature that the banking prohibition has an effect on the efficiency 
of the carbon market (Daskalakis et al., 2008). This effect, however, has not been tested so 
far and no direct evidence points to that. The argument in favour of abandoning the ban is 
that during the transition period between Phases, there is a loss of installations' flexibility to 
adhere to the emissions limitation and the ban on banking can increase inefficiency towards 
the end of each Phase. This constraint, in turn, affects the efficiency of the trade (Schleich 
et al., 2006). In addition, at the beginning of each Phase market participants have to re- 
establish their expectations and learn the new commodity mechanism. This in turn creates 
36 Banking is suggested for the Third Phase of ETS. 
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uncertainty and may increase psychological biases at the beginning of each Phase. 
In order to detect how these institutional constraints affect the price evolution in the 
market, I will conduct a two-step analysis. Firstly, I will trace the evolution of estimates for 
the capital gains coefficient throughout the First and Second Phases. Figures 5 and 6 provide 
a plot of a for the capital gains estimator for both First and Second Phases, respectively. 
Figure 5 shows a dramatic jump downwards which indicates a structural break in the data 
during the first compliance event in April 2006. This coincides with the release of official 
figures for total emissions. These results are in line with findings reported by Chevallier et 
al. (2008) who detected a dramatic change in the market perception of risk during the 2006 
compliance event. After the first compliance event the coefficient slightly increased up until 
the second compliance event in April 2007, and decreased toward the end of the First Phase. 
Figure 6 shows no dramatic changes occurred in the Second Phase. The plot of a coefficient, 
however, stabilised after the first compliance event in April 2008. In addition, Figure 5 and 
6 indicate that at the beginning of each Phase the a coefficients were significantly higher 
than during the rest of the Phase and decreasing toward the first compliance event. 
Secondly, I will divide the data set into three subsamples categories: Jan-Feb, Mar-Apr 
and the rest of the year. The first two subsamples detect changes in the Disposition effect 
before and during the submission of verified emissions, respectively. Whereas the latter 
subsample distinguishes the magnitude of Disposition during the rest of the year from the 
two submission periods, Tables 6 and 7 report the results. It is evident from the results 
that during the Mar-Apr subsamples for the First and Second Phases capital gains variables 
are significantly lower than during the preceding year subsamples. This coincides with the 
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results of the two plots of a coefficient. 
These findings suggest that, whereas banking prohibition increases Disposition in the 
market at the beginning of each phase, the first compliance events significantly diminish it 
and contribute to the stabilisation of market expectations. Such behaviour of the capital 
gains coefficient can be attributed to the degree of information uncertainty in the market. 
The literature recognises that psychological biases are increasing under conditions of higher 
information uncertainty (Hirshleifer, 2001; Daniel et al., 2001 and Zhang, 2006). When 
the market learns its real position, fewer participants are subject to psychological biases. 
This explanation is also in line with the framework proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005). 
According to the authors, the smaller the number of investors who are subject to Disposition, 
the smaller their effect on the market price. 
These results validate the proposition that institutional structure has an effect on the 
efficiency of the carbon market, which is transformed to a high Disposition effect, as I have 
reported above. The results point out that Disposition in the carbon market is a factor of 
information uncertainty, especiaUy during the first year of each Phase. In addition, the above 
results indicate that the first compliance event has a vital role in shaping the expectations in 
the market, by stabilising and/or diminishing the Disposition in the market. The question 
that arises is how to eliminate, or at the very least diminish, the Disposition in the market. 
The purpose of the next section is to address these questions. 
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17.1 Discussion and analysis 
In previous sections I have demonstrated that the price trend in the market for carbon 
permits can be explained by assuming psychological biases, specifically, the Disposition effect. 
It is not surprising to find the Disposition effect in the market of carbon permits in light of 
extensive evidence, which tracks this phenomenon in financial markets. In the context of the 
carbon market, however, these results should receive major attention. The policy designer 
should seek and eliminate the Disposition that affects trade of carbon permits. Identifying 
the source of the Disposition effect in the institutional structure of the Scheme should allow 
the policy maker to diminish its effect and increase the efficiency of the carbon maxket. 
As I have pointed out in the previous section, institutional constraints on the installation 
during the First and Second Phases of the Scheme operation, such as yearly submission and 
a ban on banking of permits, are the main drivers of the Disposition effect. Policy makers 
who wish to achieve emissions abatement in the most efficient manner should, therefore, not 
disregard these findings. These results point out that the carbon market, which should create 
an efficient environment for trade of carbon permits, is not efficient due to those constraints. 
Similar results have already been pointed out by Daskalakis et al. (2008) and Chevallier et 
al. (2008). 
The above results indicate that before the first compliance event the Disposition effect 
is higher than during the rest of the year. As I suggested above, this could be due to 
information uncertainty. One suggestion that may reduce the Disposition in the market is to 
make the information on the emissions level public. Installations that trade carbon permits 
should reveal their emissions intensity and make it publicly accessible throughout the year 
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rather than once a year. A similar method is already practiced in the stock exchange market 
where publicly traded companies are required to make their information public on a regular 
basis. It seems reasonable to make emissions levels publicly known as the benefit would be 
in the highly efficient carbon trading platform, which would benefit both the installations, 
for having an efficient trading platform, and the public, in the way of an efficient abatement 
system. 
Another way of reducing the information uncertainty as to the market position with 
respect to the carbon permits would be by engaging installations to submit permits to cover 
their emissions more frequently than once a year (a frequency that is suggested by current 
practice). This way the information gets to the market more frequently. This may eliminate 
such dramatic changes in the market expectations as were evident during the First Phase. It 
may also reduce the uncertainty in the market and in turn reduce the effect of psychological 
biases on the carbon price in a more consistent way, without creating unnecessary shocks to 
the system. The information uncertainty is to be diminished to make way for the efficient 
market of carbon permits. Reducing the uncertainty by revealing the information may reduce 
the psychological biases of the traders and create a more efficient market. These suggestions 
are in line with a proposition made by Seifert et at. (2008). The authors argue that in 
immature markets, such as the carbon market, expectation building is not working well. In 
such conditions frequent publication of emissions would improve expectation building in the 
market. 
The results of the previous section also point to another flaw of the Scheme, which is 
the ban on banking between Phases. The results show that this constraint increases the 
101 
Disposition effect at the beginning of each Phase. This flaw is addressed by the literature 
(among others see, Schleich et al., 2006 and Alberola et al., 2009). Indeed, in the proposal 
for the Third Phase of ETS, the banking ban is dropped. This proposition could contribute 
to the efficiency of the carbon market. The installations would not have to face the lack of 
information during the beginning of each Phase, and would be rewarded for carbon intensity, 
which could be planned for the future and not limited to only one Phase. 
18 Conclusions 
There is a scarcity of literature dealing with the fundamentals of the carbon price. My 
contribution to this literature is in presenting the first evidence of the Disposition effect 
in the carbon market, based on the spot price of carbon permits on the BlueNext trading 
platform from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009. The sample covers for the First and Second 
Phases of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
In the paper I presented evidence for the Disposition effect, which increases as a result 
of the institutional constraints, specifically the ban on banking and the yearly submission 
of the verified emissions. The estimated results indicate that the carbon price evolution is 
affected by the Disposition effect during the first year of each Phase. I assert that the main 
factor that drives the Disposition effect in the carbon market is information uncertainty. 
I have found that these results are robust by using an alternative method of tracing the 
Disposition effect. My results are in line with the previous evidence of the efficiency of the 
carbon market and findings that the Disposition has a positive effect on the evolution of 
price in the market. 
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I have suggested possible alternatives to resolve uncertainty in the maxket. Specifically, 
I have suggested revealing the information on the actual emissions level throughout the year 
and not only once a year. In addition, I suggest that more frequent submission of the verified 
emissions could reduce the Disposition effect in the market and make it more efficient. My 
finding also point out that the banking ban increases the psychological effect during the first 
year of each Phase. 
It is worth mentioning, however, besides the possible policy implications outlined above 
that these new results have an important implication for portfolio construction and risk 
management. For further research it would be interesting to follow the evolution of the 
carbon price during the rest of the Second Phase and see whether there are changes in 
the market due to the alternations of institutional constraints in the Third Phase of the 
Scheme. Although I present evidence on one of the well-documented behavioural anomalies 
in the financial markets, there is place to extend current research and analyse the market for 
another source of inefficiency in the market. Detailed information on the identity of traders 
could potentially contribute to more accurate analysis and policy recommendations. 
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Figure 1: Standardised log returns of carbon permit prices for the First Phase 
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Figure 2: Standardised log returns of carbon permit prices for the Second Phase. 
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Figure 4: Log returns of carbon permit prices for the Second Phase 
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Figure 5: Evolution of alpha coefficient for the First Phase. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of alpha coefficient for the Second Phase. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the series of standardised log returns 
The two sample period run from 24 June 2005 to 13 August 2009.1 excluding from the data 
set observations related to trade of'CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution 
of EUAs. I compute the log returns and standardise them by the standard deviation for the 
day the log returns are computed. The total of observations is 37,924. 
First Phase Second Phase 
sample mean -0.031 -0.004 
sample median 0.000 0.000 
sample maximum 5.671 13.341 
sample minimum -4.968 -11.127 
sample standard deviation 0.999 1.000 
sample skewness 0.036 0.389 
sample kurtosis 5.001 18.017 
number of observations 4,927 32,997 
nth order autocorrelation 
n=l 0.456 0.472 
n=2 -0.002 -0.011 
n=3 0.021 0.022 
n=4 0.012 0.018 
n=5 0.011 0.009 
n=6 0.018 0.010 
n=8 113 0.020 0.011 
n=10 0.016 0.010 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the series of logreturns 
The two sample period run from 24 June 2005 to 13 August 2009.1 exclude from the data set 
observations related to trade of CERs, in order to concentrate only on the price evolution of 
EUAs. The total of observations is 37,924. 
First Phase Second Phase 
sample mean -0-001 0.000 
sample median 0.000 0.000 
sample maximum 0.301 0.043 
sample minimum -0.301 -0.029 
sample standard deviation 0.022 0.001 
sample skewness -1-558 0.781 
sample kurtosis 52.502 51.274 
number of observations 4,927 32,997 
nth order autocorrelation 
n=l 0.433 -0.015 
n=2 -0-099 -0.489 
n=3 -0.089 0.021 
n=4 -0.078 0.000 
n=5 -0.019 -0.006 
n=6 -O. Qi7 -0.001 
n=8 -0.009 -0.005 
n=10 0.012 0.007 
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n=11 0.043 0.010 
n= 13 0.012 -0.002 
Table 3: Estimation results 
I estimate by least squares the AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) models in Equation (81) for the First 
and Second Phases, with-period that runs from 24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009, including 
all together 37,914 observations. For each parameter estimate, the figures within parenthesis 
refer to the White's (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung- 
Box's test (1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size 
reports the number of observations. 
First Phase 
ARMA(l, l) AR(l) 
Second Phase 
ARMA(l, l) AR(l) 
2.036 0.465 3.220 0.305 
(5.922) (1.397) (9.493) (0.807) 
-0.037 0.457 -0.046 0.472 (-1.706) (43.867) (-4.384) (39.17: 1) 
0.730 0.869 
(24.229) (5R. 032) 
R 2,0.222 A60.322 0.208 0.401 
Q-stat. 0.367 0.000 0.367 0.000 
sample size 4,914 4,915 32,997 32,997 
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Table 4: Robustness analysis: Sub-sampling and specification 
I estimate by least squares ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (81) for the period that runs from 
24 June 2005 to 07 August 2009, including all together 37,914 observations. The columns of 
Isubsample estimations' consider yearly subsamples and columns of 'alternative specification' 
consider capital gains variable with alternative reference. For each parameter estimate, the 
figures within parenthesis refer to the White's (1980) t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports 
Q-statistics of Liung-Box's test (1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The 
row sample size reports the number of observations. 
2005 
sub-sample estimations 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
altrenative specifcation 
First Phase Second Phase 
Q! 11.192 3.969 1.774 9.499 4.710 1.926 17.566 (4.335) (4.662) (3.045) (6.693) (6.775) (3.123) (14.098) 
0 0.021 -0.040 -0.006 -0.072 -0.043 -0.041 -0.045 (0.333) (-1.476) (-1.522) (-3.829) (-3.410) (-2.064) (-4.244) 
0.669 0.747 0.726 0.847 0.881 0.734 0.868 
(15.88: 1) (49.503) (25.091) (102.828) (184.344) (53.251) (20: 1.151) 
R2, 
A Ij 0.324 0.335 0.288 0.376 0.412 0.326 0.404 
Q-stat- 0.933 0.691 0.187 0.920 0.673 0.978 0.367 
sample size 628 3,055 1,240 9,543 23,454 4,697 32,970 
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Table 5: Robustness analysis: ARMA-GARCH 
I estimate by maximum likelihood the ARMA(l, l)-GARCH(l, l) models in Equations (82) 
and (84) for the First and Second Phases, with period that runs from 24 June 2005 to OT 
August 2009 , including all together 3T, 914 observations. For each parameter estimate, the 
figures within parenthesis refer to the t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of 
Ljung-Box's test (1979). The row ARCH LM reports the p-value of Engle's (1982) LM test 
for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to order 13. The row sample size reports 
the number of observations. 
First Phase Second Phase 
01 0.074 0.005 (11.304) (5.745) 
01 -0.011 -0.085 (-0.687) (-6.262) 
IPI 0.963 0.997 
(277.728) (837324.2) 
ßo 0.000 0.000 
(33.2: 11 (5.103) 
01 0.094 0.262 
(52.991) (7.501) 
02 0.927 0.640 
(772.548) (19.781) 
R2 A(G 0.444 0.482 
Q-stat. 0.023 0.000 
ARCH LM 0.999 0.999 
sample size 4,915 32,984 
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Table 6: Estimation results for Disposition effect in the First Phase 
I estimate by least squares the ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (81) for the First Phase, with 
data for the period that runs from 24 June 2005 to 27 February 2008, including all together 
4,925 observations. For each parameter estimate, the figures within parenthesis refer to the 
White's (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-Box's test 
(1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size reports the 
number of observations. 
Panel A 
Jul-Dec '05 
Panel B 
Jan-Feb '06 
Panel C 
Mar-Apr '06 
Panel D 
May-Dec '06 
Panel E 
Jan-Feb '07 
Panel F 
Mar-Apr '07 
Panel G 
May-Dec '07 
11.192 20.931 3.640 3.657 5.523 0.834 0.523 
(4.252) (3.098) (4.072) (3.875) (4.916) (0.474) (0.734) 
0.021 -0-009 -0.043 -0.045 -0.044 -0.053 -0-153 (0.445) (-0.163) (-0.745) (-1.6(; 5) (-0.956) (-0.671) (-2.044) 
0.669 0.735 0.771 0.746 0.815 0.648 0.710 
(17.261) (15.795) (IFt. 255)) (36.567) (28.158) (9.138) (12.107) 
R 2, A Ij 0.324 0.335 0.346 0.329 0.356 0.255 0.228 
Q-stat. 0.933 0.375 0.885 0.944 0.850 0,631 0.499 
sample size 628 422 500 2133 614 321 305 
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Table 7: Estimation results for Disposition effect in the Second Phase 
I estimate by least squares the ARMA(1,1) model in Equation (81) for the Second Phase, with 
data for the period that runs from 08 April 2008 to 07 August 2009, including all together 
32,997 observations. For each parameter estimate, the figures within parenthesis refer to the 
White's (1980) robust t-statistics. The row Q-stat. reports Q-statistics of Ljung-Box's test 
(1979) for autocorrelation in the residuals up to order 13. The row sample size reports the 
number of observations. 
Panel A 
April-Dec '08 
Panel B 
Jan-Feb '09 
Panel C 
Mar-Apr '09 
Panel D 
May-Aug '09 
9.499 3.492 5.686 7.511 
(6.69: 3) (3.492) (4.023) (4.579) 
-0.072 -0.017 -0.033 -0.062 (-3.829) (-1.389) (-3.068) 
0.847 0.913 0.871 0.873 
(102.828) (169.302) (96.26 1) (103. f)6f)) 
'Fý2A, b 0.376 0.444 0.411 0.396 
Q-stat. 0.920 0.745 0.885470 0.894 
sample size 9,543 6,394 6,722 10,388 
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